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All too frequently big business has dominated popular perceptions of 
the Japanese economy. Large firms are deemed to have powered Japan's 
growth through their real successes in generating output, raising produc-
tivity, absorbing and creating innovations through large-scale R&D, and 
creating and developing "the Japanese management system" of industrial 
relations, internal decisionmaking and close intragroup affiliations. 
Big business plays a highly visible, broad political and social role, 
financing political leaders and their factions, influencing national 
economic and other policy, serving as a role model, and preaching its 
business ideology. It is a system of male managerial elites dealing on 
equal footing in carefully developed formal and informal networks with 
counterpart elites—central government bureaucrats, elite politicians, 
and others holding power at the top of the pyramid of Japan's hierarchi-
cal society. Some characterize big business as the brain and the central 
nervous system of Japan's economy. 
If that is the case, then small enterprise is the economic, politi-
cal, and social heart and backbone of Japan. In particular small-scale 
family enterprises have long been and continue to be a large and dynamic 
element in the political economy of Japan--in entrepreneurship, job 
creation, output and political clout. Small business makes up the bottom 
two-thirds (or more) of Japan's social and economic pyramid. It is a 
curious mixture of seething activity, often turbulent change, and calm, 
We have benefited from research assistance especially by Michael 
Smitka, and by Frances McCall, Hilary Hinds and Noriaki Fukushima, and 
from comments by Kazuo Koike, Kazuo Sato, Ted Bestor, Kent Calder and 
Robert Chapman Wood as well as the participants at the JPERC conferences. 
Aside from correcting many of our errors and mis-perceptions, they raised 
many important issues—sufficient to keep us busy the rest of our lives. 
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quiet, even stoic inertia. Small business is the main provider of 
employment for the Japanese and thereby the source of consumer demand; it 
engages in almost half of business investment as well. Small business, 
as comprehensively defined here, is extremely heterogeneous and not 
unified politically or in other ways; nonetheless subgroups are effective 
in exercising political power to achieve well-defined, typically econom-
ic, goals. Small business is at once the source and repository of great 
social stability, the locus of a considerable range of tolerated behavior 
(what Westerners might even term "individualism")* and the carrier and 
implementer of social and cultural change. Many small businessmen are 
conformists, but few are company men of the sort that prevails in large 
enterprises. 
A big-small classification of enterprise size is obviously too 
simple, as is any delimitation in the consideration of small-scale 
enterprise to a few sectors. In principle, we consider here the role of 
small-scale units of ownership and production--enterprise in the broadest 
sense--in all sectors of the economy, from farming to manufacturing, 
construction, retail sales, and personal services. Enterprises range 
over a continuum of firm sizes; obviously, in numbers most are very small 
and only a few (2,040 or 0.2 per cent of total incorporated 
enterprises) employ more than 1,000 workers. Where to divide the 
continuum into segments depends on the purpose. Here we are concerned 
primarily with enterprises of fewer than 100 workers, especially units of 
less than 30 workers and minuscule units of fewer than five workers. 
Small-scale enterprise is quantitatively as well as qualitatively 
important in Japan1s economy. In a three-size classification, small 
enterprises in 1982 provided jobs for 36.5 million Japanese men and 
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women, 68.7 per cent of private sector employment; medium-sized firms 
(100-999 workers) accounted for 16.2 per cent; and big business 15.0 per 
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cent. Small enterprises, with more than two-thirds the labor force, 
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produce close to half of the GNP originating in the private sector. 
Japan is a country teeming with small-scale family enterprises, more 
so than any other advanced industrial country. Many are entrepreneuri-
ally vigorous; many others are content, or doomed, to drift along. We 
recognize that small-scale family enterprises (SFEs), typically located 
in or near the family home, represent a complex economic, social and 
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psychological phenomenon. Our focus is primarily upon its economic 
features, particularly in terms of the owner-operator and his/her imme-
diate family. (The intrafamilial dynamics of the owner-operator and 
family workers are complex, fascinating, and beyond the scope of this 
study.) Even among SFEs, size makes for qualitative differences. A 
100-worker firm is probably more similar to a 300-worker firm than to a 
30-worker firm. Moreover, minuscule enterprises of fewer than five 
workers are qualitatively distinctive: the workers consist almost 
entirely of owner-operators and family members; fewer than 15 per cent 
are wage-earning employees. 
Our main interest here is in the ownership and operation of SFEs 
with fewer than 30 workers. Put simply, there are some 9.5 million 
Japanese owner-operators of these SFEs throughout Japan, almost one-fifth 
(18.0 per cent) of the labor force. Of these, 2.4 million are farmers, 
six million run unincorporated nonfarm businesses, and almost 1.1 million 
head small incorporated enterprises. Adding in about 6.5 million unpaid 
and paid family members, almost one-third (31.2 per cent) of Japan1s 
labor force work as owners and family members of SFEs. When their hired 
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employees are included these SFEs employ more than half the labor force 
(see Table 3, next section). 
These macroeconomic facts, while illuminating, conceal the tremen-
dous diversity and heterogeneity of small-scale family enterprises—in 
goals and behavior, success and failure, innovativeness and conservatism, 
flexibilities and rigidities, and sectoral differences and similarities. 
Two polar-opposite kinds of SFE stories can be told. 
One story is premised on the positive pull of opportunity, ambition, 
ability, and the preference to be onefs own boss. In it a reasonably 
favorable environment provides identifiable opportunities; individuals 
possess entrepreneurial drive, ambition, and freedom of choice; and they 
obtain and use resources productively and efficiently. The ultimate 
result is economic and personal success. It is a story of optimism and 
hope. 
The negative story is one of lack of opportunities; limited choices 
under adverse circumstances, inefficiency and defensiveness, survival by 
taking advantage of imperfect land or labor markets, and low wages and 
incomes. Families may own assets, especially land, the implicit rental 
value of which they can obtain most effectively through some inefficient 
type of production. Persons may be discriminated against—especially 
women, older persons, Burakumin, and Koreans. Or they may be people of 
marginal ability, skills, personality, or motivation. It is a story of 
resignation, even despair. At its extremes this is a story of exploita-
tion, of labor as workers and petty bourgeoisie families striving desper-
ately to subsist however they can while high incomes accrue to the 
owners, managers, and workers of large enterprises. 
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In real life the two stories are mixed. Moreover, we do not want to 
imply that the stories indicate much beyond material wellbeing; there are 
after all many anxious, unhappy, "successful" people, and many others who 
are content no matter how plain or simple their lives. The negative 
story of engaging in marginal activities may prevail temporarily for a 
family who, due to dire circumstances, waits until something better comes 
along or to amass a little capital to start anew. It is difficult to 
assert a priori which story is likely to prevail and under what circum-
stances, because of the heterogeneity of individuals and families, their 
circumstances, and the specifics of any such opportunities as may exist. 
In general, the negative situation characterizes industries or sectors 
declining because of inefficiency and an inability to compete, such as 
part-time agriculture and minuscule retail shops. Owners and their 
families are in general probably better off than their wage-earning 
employees. A core of quite skilled, regular (male) workers are paid 
substantially higher wages than middle-aged females and part-time workers 
(these two categories overlap substantially). 
The subject of SFEs raises a host of interpretive issues involving 
the economy as a whole. Why is the SFE sector so large? What does its 
large size mean for the political economy as a whole? More speculative-
ly, what are its likely prospects for and effects on Japan*s future? Is 
the large share that small-scale enterprise holds in Japan's economy 
mainly a lagged phenomenon, requiring a generational process of adjust-
ment to an earlier phase of Japan's economic development? Or does it 
reflect an effective way to organize production in Japan's current, and 
future, affluent economy? Do SFEs survive mainly because of "exploit-
ative" wage rates which are the consequence of labor market dualism, or 
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do lower wages reflect the heterogeneity of labor in relatively competi-
tive labor markets? Can the multitude of small-scale entrepreneurs best 
be described as successfully utilizing existing assets, as ambitious 
people seeking independence, or as people who lack better alternatives? 
Is government protection a major factor in the persistence of so many 
SFEs? 
As already stated, our central focus is on the ownership and opera-
tion of small family enterprises: how they come into being, exist, 
transform themselves, and in some cases disappear. By "small" we usually 
mean enterprises with fewer than 30 workers, including the myriad of very 
small unincorporated enterprises. While the operation of labor markets, 
firm size differentials in wages and other forms of remuneration, and the 
well-being of workers in SFEs are important elements in our story, they 
are not central. Hence, this is more an essay on the political economy 
of small-scale industrial organization than on that of labor. 
In contradiction to those who propound the "exploitation" and 
"lagged" interpretations, we view small-scale family-owned and operated 
enterprises mostly in a positive light. While some sectors are clearly 
marginal or failing remnants of an earlier era, some are dynamic and 
growing; many provide sound, stable incomes. SFEs are a dynamic source 
of flexibility for the Japanese economy. In many instances they prove 
efficient and responsive to market demands. The individuals and families 
that make up SFEs combine their human attributes--entrepreneurship, 
labor, skills and knowledge, ambition, willingness to take risk, networks 
of social relationships—with ownership of land and other physical and 
financial assets. This, indeed, is their essence and their economic and 
social rationale. The successful persistence of small business is also 
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due in substantial part to the distribution of land ownership and landfs 
high value, the heterogeneity of labor (and to some extent segmentation 
of labor markets), and supportive government policies, especially in tax 
treatment. Perhaps most of all, it reflects the depth of entrepreneurial 
ambition and talent in Japan. 
Several cautionary notes. First, the smaller the scale, the more 
fluid and less reliable the data. In particular, most successful SFEs 
underreport their true economic profits through tax avoidance and, in 
many cases, tax evasion. Accordingly value added, family income, implic-
it wage rates, and return on investment are understated. Second, the 
heterogeneity among SFEs is so great that generalizations are certain to 
require significant exceptions. We focus on agriculture, manufacturing 
and retailing, the three largest sectors. For small high tech venture 
firms see the chapter by Okimoto and Saxonhouse. The construction 
industry is not considered, even though small local firms play a particu-
larly active role in the political economy of public construction con-
tracts and the financing of politicians. Third, the data problems 
associated with scale within SFEs are serious. Government statistics 
typically lump small and medium enterprise together; the Census of 
Manufactures no longer collects data on the smallest (one to four worker) 
firms; frequently manufacturing data refer only to firms with 30 or more 
employees; and financial data mainly are for incorporated enterprises. 
In the next section we provide a descriptive overview, first in 
macro perspective, and then specifically for agriculture, manufacturing 
and retailing. In the following section we examine economic, social, and 
political reasons for the persistently high proportion of small family 
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enterprises in the Japanese economy. In the final section we discuss the 
future role of small business in Japan. 
I. A Descriptive Overview 
Surprisingly little cross-country comparative research exists on 
small-scale enterprise. The quality of data apparently is directly 
related to the degree of importance attached to small firms; though the 
level of rhetoric is substantial everywhere, Japan and the United States 
have the best data and the most extensive programs of financial and other 
support, while the Western European countries seemingly have less actual 
8 interest. 
Japan's small-scale enterprise sector is large in comparison with 
its counterparts in other advanced industrial societies. Self-employed 
workers and unpaid family workers comprise a far larger proportion of the 
labor force in Japan (29 per cent) than in France (17 per cent), Germany 
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(14 per cent), the U.S. (nine per cent), or the U.K. (eight per cent). 
The differences lie not so much in agriculture as in manufacturing and in 
retailing. In Japanese manufacturing, 46.5 per cent of workers have jobs 
in establishments with fewer than 50 workers, more than in Italy (44.4 
per cent), the United States (15.2 per cent) and the United Kingdom (15.9 
per cent). The other Western European countries are in between, but are 
closer on average to Japan. The same pattern is even more pronounced 
for establishments with fewer than ten workers. Furthermore, when 
compared with the United States, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
value-added per worker is considerably lower in small firms when measured 
against the value-added in large Japanese firms. Subcontracting is 
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more prevalent in Japan than elsewhere. Similarly, although they are of 
lower productivity, Japan has many more retail stores relative to popu-
lation than the United States or Western Europe. 
Interestingly the share of businesses with 100 or fewer employees 
was remarkably constant at 40 per cent in the United States between 1963 
and 1977, while in Japan it rose modestly from 51 per cent in 1962 (and 
1971) to 56 per cent in 1979. The Japanese government provides far more 
finance to small business than the American, about $66 billion in loans 
outstanding in 1982 versus $3.8 billion by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, and loan guarantees of $21.8 billion versus $1.6 
12 billion. However, the interest subsidy was substantially farther below 
market rates in the United States than Japan. 
As Kiyonari stresses, small business was completely transformed by 
13 the two decades*of high growth ending in the early 1970s. For many 
firms profits increased, technology improved, investment deepened; SFEs 
grew rapidly, and so too did their number. Buyer-supplier relationships, 
especially in subcontracting, deepened and became more stable. 
Between 1971 and 1982 the share of small-scale enterprises (fewer 
than 100 workers) in total employment remained essentially constant, 
since increases in retail and wholesale trade and other services have 
offset the decline in agriculture. Table 1 provides detailed information 
on SFEs with fewer than 30 workers for 1971 and 1982. The absolute 
number of workers increased though the ratio decreased slightly, but 
there were significant changes in composition. An overall decrease in 
self-employed individual proprietors and family workers took place solely 
in agriculture; the numbers increased in all other sectors. This oc-
curred even though for tax and other reasons many SFEs incorporated 
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themselves. Indeed, the total number of SFEs has risen significantly. 
Between 1960 and 1981 incorporated enterprises increased from 414,000 to 
1,187,000; not surprisingly, almost all were small, but more than three-
14 quarters of the increase were firms with fewer than ten employees. 
Unincorporated enterprises also increased, from 3,467,000 in 1969 to 
4,178,000 in 1981. These are net figures; birth, growth, and death (or 
transformation) are treated later. 
There are three kinds of participants in small-scale enterprise: 
self-employed owner-operators; "unpaid" family workers; and wage-earning 
employees. Of the total labor force (57.8 million in 1982), some 15 per 
cent, almost all women, define themselves as working partly (less than 
200 days per year) with their main activities elsewhere, almost always in 
taking care of the household. More than four-fifths of part-timers work 
in very small enterprises. Further basic data on labor force allocation 
appear in Tables 2 and 3. We have already noted the striking fact that 
over half Japan1s total labor force works in enterprises of fewer than 30 
workers. The largest share (28.2 per cent) is in wholesale and retail 
trade, followed closely by agriculture (27.6 per cent), and then services 
(16.0 per cent) and manufacturing. 
Yet the most startling, and perhaps most distinctive, feature of 
Japan's SFEs is the immense share of minuscule enterprises with one to 
four workers (including the proprietor). Some 30.6 per cent of the total 
labor force work in minuscule units; since three-fifths of those who are 
working only partly are in these enterprises, minuscule units account for 
a smaller share (12.3 million workers, 15.6 per cent) of the mainly 
working labor force. Indeed, almost all the self-employed (93.7 per 
cent) and unpaid family workers (89.3 per cent) are in minuscule 
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enterprises. Only one-fifth of the workers in minuscule enterprise are 
wage-earning employees. Such minuscule production units include almost 
all Japanese in agriculture (93.7 per cent), but also 38.7 per cent of 
those in wholesale and retail trade. Some three-fifths of small busi-
nesses, and four-fifths of retail stores, are "home businesses" in which 
owner and family constitute more than half the labor force. Moreover, 
about one-fifth of small enterprisers engage in a secondary line of 
business; in rural areas a quarter of those are in farming or fishing, in 
urban areas "apartment rental is popular." 
Other important features of the small-scale family-enterprise sector 
are their sex and age compositions. Females are particularly concentrat-
ed in small enterprises. Four-fifths of the family workers are women. 
While almost one-third (3.0 million) of those classified as self-employed 
are women, one-third of these are doing piecework at home at extremely 
low wages. Even so, some two million women run their own enterprises. 
Almost a quarter of them are in agriculture but many more are in servic-
es, especially those catering primarily to other women—Avon ladies, life 
18 insurance, and so on. As Hill has shown, for married women the choice 
is not "to work or not to work," but three-fold: to work as a wage-
earning employee, to work in a family enterprise as an unpaid family 
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member or as its proprietor, or to engage in household work. 
Other workers are also drawn to, or end up in, small-scale opera-
tions. One-third of the working persons aged 55-64 are in minuscule (one 
to four workers) enterprises, as are almost half of those still working 
after 65. Minuscule enterprises have disproportionately more older 
workers and few younger workers, yet otherwise the age distribution by 
firm size does not vary greatly except for in large firms where young 
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workers are disproportionately numerous. A far higher proportion of old 
people work in Japan than in other industrial nations. 
Small-scale enterprises are dominant in terms of employment and of 
great importance in terms of output in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
construction, retail and wholesale trade, and personal services. They 
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comprise a very significant share of the overall manufacturing and a 
dominant share in many manufacturing industries. Wholesale and retail 
trade has the largest share (27.2 per cent) of SFE employment, followed 
by manufacturing (19.2 per cent), personal services (17.8 per cent), and 
agriculture (14.2 per cent). 
Excluding agriculture, SFEs on average are substantively less 
productive than medium and large firms which, with 30 per cent of the 
labor force, produce about half the GNP. The evidence is overwhelming 
that value added per worker and income per worker increases monotonically 
with enterprise size, and that a very substantial gap persists between 
the extremes of firm size. On the other hand, especially with tax 
evasion, the rate of return on capital may well be higher in smaller 
enterprises. In manufacturing in 1981 value-added per worker in estab-
lishments of 1000 plus was 2.39 times that of a worker in establishments 
of 4-99 workers, though the wage gap was substantially narrower. 
Nonetheless, over the past two decades the growth in value-added per 
worker in small enterprise has been at least as rapid as in large firms 
(the minuscule one to four worker firms always constitute a special 
problem, not only of data but of comprehending the underlying reality). 
The initially wide gap in value added between large firms and small 
narrowed until the mid-1970s, but has widened subsequently. The similar-
ly large gap in capital per worker also narrowed until 1975, and has 
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continued to narrow since, albeit modestly. Wage differentials by firm 
size narrowed sharply from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s and leveled 
off until 1972-3, but they have since widened modestly. (See the chapter 
by Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba.) 
In sum, small business is not a lagging sector; on the whole, it is 
prosperous and healthy and growing as rapidly as the rest of the economy. 
But it is not correct to regard small business as the engine of GNP 
21 growth; it has not been the major source of R&D and innovation. 
Nonetheless, SFEs do contribute significantly to growth—as the recipi-
ents of technological diffusion, as sources of on-the-job innovations, as 
active investors in new (and used) equipment, as major suppliers of 
consumer goods and services, and as flexible users and absorbers of most 
of the labor force. 
Agriculture. Farming is a special and extreme case of small scale 
family enterprise. While in many respects it is very different from 
small scale family enterprises in manufacturing and the tertiary sector, 
there are numerous reasons for some considerations of agriculture, 
especially for comparative purposes, since European and other countries 
also provide policies to maintain family farms, however inefficient. 
The two key factors making possible the continuation of so many 
family farms have been the farmerfs ownership of his land and the govern-
ment policies of restraining import competition and to providing huge 
direct subsidies while allowing domestic agricultural prices to rise 
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substantially. In these respects agriculture stands in clear contrast 
to most other SFEs. The benefit to farmers has been high—rising incomes 
and growth in the value of their main asset: land. The benefit to the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been a strong base of political 
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support. Society in general has benefited from a more equal income 
distribution and a greater degree of food self-sufficiency. But the 
economic costs have been enormous, equivalent to more than half the 
value-added in the agricultural sector. These have been borne by consum-
ers and taxpayers. The costs include not only very high prices for 
agricultural products but inefficient and excessive allocation of capi-
tal, land, and perhaps even labor. More efficient policy packages could 
achieve the same goals at substantially lower costs, but they are resist-
ed by organized agriculture since farmers know the benefits of the 
present system of support and fear that any changes might undermine that 
commitment. 
The basic economic problem is that major improvements in technology 
and financing, and the rapidly increasing opportunity cost of labor have 
sharply enlarged the minimal size of family farms required for interna-
tionally competitive production far beyond anything even contemplated 
today in Japan. Achievement of optimal size (i.e. of competitiveness) is 
further impeded by Japan's mountainous terrain. By the criteria of world 
prices for agricultural products, much submarginal land is currently in 
production. Land consolidation is impeded because land is overpriced; 
the renting of land confers de facto ownership rights, so owners are 
unwilling to lease out; and idle land is taxed at higher rates, so 
something should be grown. Farmers and others have rationally held land 
for speculative purposes, in the anticipation that land will increase in 
value more rapidly than other assets--reflecting, in part at least, a 
higher opportunity cost of land in some areas for factories, office 
buildings, and housing, as well as lenient tax policies. 
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Yet in a social and political sense, agrarian policy has been 
remarkably successful. Rapid and sustained growth has made it inevitable 
that agriculture would become an uncompetitive, declining industry; labor 
and savings would have to be absorbed elsewhere, and the costs of struc-
tural adjustment would have to be borne. On the whole, government policy 
has managed this process brilliantly. Income has been redistributed and 
equalized. The social infrastructure has vastly improved, especially 
roads and transportation to nearby towns and cities where jobs were being 
created by rapid growth. No economy has ever gone through so rapid a 
decline in the agrarian labor force as Japan has since 1955. Essentially 
all (97 per cent) of the new generation take nonfarm jobs; their parents 
now commute to nearby nonfarm jobs while continuing to live at home, 
reducing the demand for urban housing and infrastructure. 
The problem is that government policy has gone too far. It raised 
agricultural prices and incomes too much and gave too many tax exemp-
tions. It has retarded structural adjustment through crop diversifica-
tion and land consolidation too much. Yet, rhetoric to the contrary, 
government policy toward agriculture fundamentally changed from the late 
1970s. The decision not to raise the government purchase price to 
producers of rice further (it has risen on average far less than the CPI 
since 1976) and to hold the line on subsidy payments while cutting back 
on acreage under cultivation has set the policy terms by which the 
attractiveness of farming will gradually but steadily decrease. The 
future of small family enterprise in agriculture is that of a very 
economically inefficient, politically powerful sector about to embark on 
major generational change. 
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A crucial question is whether a similar pattern is or will be found 
in the case of those elements of small manufacturing and retailing that 
are declining. Given the numbers of people involved, this is indeed a 
significant political issue. 
Manufacturing. We have already provided data demonstrating the 
important share of small family enterprises in manufacturing output and 
employment (see Tables 1 and 3). There are of course substantial differ-
ences by industry depending on specific technology and capital scale 
requirements. Not surprisingly, small enterprises predominate in labor-
intensive industries. The popular view is that most small-scale manufac-
turing involves specialized production of specific components or parts, 
or their assembly, for much larger producers of final products for 
domestic or foreign markets. There is substantial truth in this perspec-
tive. Slightly more than three-fifths of SFE manufacturers are subcon-
tractors. That also means almost two-fifths of the SFEs produce final 
products for domestic consumption or investment, or for export markets. 
The share of direct exports in small and medium enterprise production is 
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only about 6.5 per cent; however, firms producing exports specialize 
24 greatly in their specific export products. 
Several types of manufactures and organizations are often distin-
guished. Traditional goods (such as kimonos, lacquerware, paper fans) 
catering to predominantly Japanese tastes is one. The success of tradi-
tional goods industries depends on income, the price elasticities of 
domestic demand, and changes in tastes; exports are negligible and the 
possibility of import competition limited. Products (including food 
products) which serve local or regional markets is another type. Small-
scale producers for local markets face increasing competition, both from 
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larger Japanese producers and from imports. A third consists of labor 
intensive modern products generated for the national market by geograph-
ically clustered SFEs. Handbags, pencils, toys, flatware and printing 
are examples. Certain types of machinery are produced by small, or at 
most medium-sized, enterprises. 
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A closer examination of several cases is instructive. About 2,000 
companies are listed as briefcase manufacturers of which 80 per cent are 
located in Tokyo, primarily in two wards of the city. The average firm 
has seven workers. Some prepare and dye the leather; some make things 
such as metal fittings. Central to the arrangements are coordinating 
contractors (tonya) who take orders, purchase materials, delegate the 
manufacturing, and when the product is finished manage its storage and 
shipping. The actual construction of the briefcases goes to a "maker" 
firm which typically utilizes from ten to 20 separate subcontractors for 
the majority of work involved. Most of these, in turn, circulate piece 
work to women to do at home (naishoku). All elements of the system are 
owner operated businesses, with subcontractors being almost entirely 
minuscule family units comprised of husbands and wives, occasionally with 
a relative or employee added. Nearly all produce at home. Hours are 
generally long (10-12 hours on busy days), but vary a good deal with the 
level of business. Gross sales figures also vary widely, but the average 
monthly income in 1976 was about Y300,000 ($1,200) for subcontractors 
which amounts at most to Y1,000 ($4.00) per hour in a husband-wife 
operation, hardly better than the average wage level in the industry. 
Briefcases could be manufactured in larger factories as a unitary 
operation. A larger piece of land would be required, and a large consol-
idated initial investment would be needed for equipment. A means of 
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gathering and keeping labor with requisite specific skills, namely an 
attractive employment system, would be necessary. All this would presum-
ably require a high confidence in the size of initial demand. 
Yet, since the variety of styles is great, briefcases are not 
manufactured by highly mechanized processes. The savings in production 
costs that consolidated, longer runs would bring would amount to very 
little, whereas an operation under one roof would entail higher costs due 
to increased inflexibilities of labor utilization, greater pressure on 
wages, and greater investment costs. Moreover, in light of the preferen-
tial tax treatment of small SFEs, corporate profits taxes would undoubt-
edly be higher. The dispersion versus consolidation of processing steps 
raises the further issue of coordination and reliability. Can indepen-
dent units keep in synchronization as styles, costs, and so forth shift? 
Can they remain part of a single system without unified ownership and 
management? The answer appears to be "yes" for many of these cluster 
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industries. New forms of labor-saving mechanization might make larger 
scale units efficient, yet given the present arrangement, mechanization 
of individual steps in the process is accomplished by existing small 
firms (assuming loans and technical advice are available). A system of 
larger company management (bureaucratic) would not benefit from the 
competition among suppliers that keeps costs down while delivering 
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quality in each step of production. 
Once established, such "cluster" industries often go far in modern-
izing on the basis of integrated small scale operations. In some in-
stances, such as the flatware industry in Niigata Prefecture, the entire 
system has successfully shifted from one kind of metal product to another 
with the common threads being production technologies and the production 
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network of participating families. An industry of this kind, once set 
down in history (tied to the land and socially organized), has strong 
incentives to adapt and unite to protect itself. 
Their niches are often quite marginal, however, and are threatened 
by cheaper foreign imports and new manufacturing processes. Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, for example, are capable of making quality 
briefcases at wage rates roughly one quarter of those in the Tokyo 
industry. Both kinds of threats create downward pressure on wages and 
costs in an already competitive industry, and the niches left to exploit 
are ones involving responsiveness to narrower, high end market segments. 
Large-scale and foreign competition also create pressure for government 
protection, intensified by the local density of cluster industries. Some 
medium-size cities, for example, depend almost entirely on a particular 
industry. 
While some small-scale industries are in decline, others are grow-
ing. From 1968 to 1978 the number of metal fabricating machine shops 
with four or fewer workers increased in Tokyo by 62 per cent while 
larger shops (those with ten or more workers) declined by nearly 25 per 
cent. The industryfs ten-year growth resulted almost entirely from the 
creation of nearly 5,000 new SFEs in Toyko. How did this occur and why 
was growth primarily in the smallest scale segment of the industry? 
Most small machine shops develop in small incremental steps. 
Experienced individual operators typically first shift to subcontracting 
for their former employers, often borrowing space and machinery from him 
to accomplish this. The next stage is to move into separate rented space 
(often in another machine shop). Used machinery can be bought on rela-
tively accommodating terms, but an independent space rental involves "key 
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money" (typically equivalent to ten months rent). As business expands an 
employee and a second machine may be taken on. If expansion continues, 
the point will be reached when the entrepreneur, in turn, agrees to set 
up one of his employees as a subcontractor. 
Why would he want to do this? It is very difficult to keep skilled 
workers satisfied in this industry after they have six to eight years of 
experience. Limited wage increases and growing skill create a strong 
desire for independence. There are also severe space limitations to 
consider since the average factory size is but 25-40m2. To make a virtue 
of necessity, owners help the spin-out process in hopes of gaining 
benefits from the continuing relationship. That is, "offspring" compa-
nies form part of the "parent's" network through which new orders and 
valuable information are exchanged; frequently the "parent" entrepreneur 
serves as a broker for new orders, guaranteeing the product*s reliability 
and delivery date, and receiving a fee for his services. 
The notable point is that productive efficiency is not apparently 
affected by the overall scale of the operation. Whether there is one 
machine or many does not matter. What matters is the operator's skill 
and whether more expensive, more efficient machines will drive out such a 
small scale approach. If loans are available and demand is steady, there 
is little that precludes such minute subcontractors from acquiring the 
new machines. However, a higher initial investment will necessarily mean 
higher barriers to entry. It follows that stable production technologies 
bring down the barriers to small scale entry in forms of manufacturing 
that involve separate small processes. Equally important are the ways 
social ties and an initially minuscule starting point keep the barriers 
to entry low for insiders. 
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Turning to SFE subcontracting for large assembly "parent" firms, the 
basic issue is why subcontracting of this kind is so extensive in Japan. 
The question strikes at the heart of industrial organization, at issues 
of organization versus market, of factor market imperfections, and of 
technological innovation and dissemination. These issues are also 
addressed in the chapters by Aoki and Uekusa. 
About 60 per cent of Japan1s small manufacturers exist primarily 
because they produce parts (or do subassembly) for larger design/ 
assembly/marketing companies. As such, they are quasi-independent 
members of large, complex systems typically involving many subcontracting 
companies of varying sizes gathered around a central large company* 
While subcontracting is found in every economy and is common to a broad 
range of products, in Japan subcontracting is notable for (1) the exten-
sive role it plays in a large number of industries, (2) its highly 
evolved character, and (3) its capacity to adapt to rapid technological 
change. All of this implies that Japanese subcontracting is comparative-
ly efficient. 
Subcontracting relationships can run from the simple (e.g., a one-
time agreement to supply a component part at a fixed price in terms 
between two firms that have no other relations) to the complex (e.g., an 
on-going cooperative relationship centering on the creation of products 
of a particular type at prices and terms that are periodically renegoti-
ated, in which the two firms' personnel regularly interact over many 
functional areas including cost control, design engineering, finance, 
manufacturing engineering and R&D in a manner approaching cooperative 
efforts internal to a single firm). Japanese subcontracting is impres-
sive in its inclination to and capacity for highly complex, "evolved" 
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relationships, ones which presumably generate higher levels of efficien-
cy, over longer time periods, by taking advantage of many forms of 
complementariness between the contracting and subcontracting firm (or, 
more often, many subcontracting firms). Particularly in the more complex 
relationships, labor cost differentials are but one reason for the use of 
subcontracting. 
The basic kinds of complementariness involved are: (1) manufactur-
ing specialization vs. design marketing specialization; (2) separate 
types of specialization within production technology; (3) separate 
investment specializations in production equipment; (4) R&D specializa-
tion; (5) different labor costs; (6) differentials in overhead costs; (7) 
different capacities for flexibility and change (staffing, systems, 
low-volume product runs); and (8) different financing advantages (includ-
ing access to financial markets, extended and at times flexible payment 
terms, and shifts in inventory burdens). Small subcontracting manufac-
turers survive by exchanging one or more of these complementary advan-
tages with a total subcontracting system. The more developed the 
arrangement, the greater the potential for more kinds of 
complementariness. 
There are, at the same time, many "arms length" aspects and contrac-
tual protections involved in subcontracting relationships (see Uekusa 
chapter). Information sharing is far from perfect and risk management 
necessitates some price/quality guarantees over extended periods when 
large investments are involved. 
How well large companies manage their subcontracting network has 
29 become a major aspect of competition. The proportion of manufacturing 
costs that are external has risen well above 50 per cent for many 
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important products (e.g., electronics, autos). Close cooperation is 
necessary in the design stage, and managerial leadership is needed to 
effect systemwide changes and cost improvements. 
What makes the best management strategy when the capacity of produc-
tion is great and the product is constantly changing appears to differ 
considerably from country to country. In Japan the tendency has been to 
create a deepening bond with suppliers, allowing for closer cooperation 
and supervision. Assemblers have avoided high fixed costs, but they also 
grow dependent on the external supply systems they create. The Japanese 
choice is basically to seek efficiencies of a long-term relational kind 
rather than to maximize market efficiencies in which many "arm's length" 
suppliers compete in what are essentially spot markets. This has meant 
that the capacity to maximize coordination between firms is a major 
management skill. The entrepreneurial activity of small suppliers is 
encouraged within a narrowly defined context, one determined and guided 
by the larger firms. Coordinated interdependence results in the creation 
of value that makes both parties more independent in other markets. 
Japan measures its subcontracting system in a number of ways that 
highlight its notable qualities. It asks about the number and weight of 
important customers in total sales. The weight of a parent firm or firms 
in the world of each subcontractor indicates the character of the 
relationship. 
Two-thirds of the smallest manufacturing enterprises—those with one 
to three employees—engage in subcontracting, and for them the signifi-
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cance of a single "parent" firm is overwhelming. Eighty per cent of 
their production goes to one customer. We can best imagine operations as 
if they were based in a family, with the entire operation oriented to 
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manufacturing since a single "parent" takes virtually all the output. 
Overhead and labor costs are low (and also difficult to determine accu-
rately due to the family basis of operations). In many cases, raw 
materials, designs and even machinery and technical advice are supplied 
by the parent firm. The existence of tiny subcontractors of this kind, 
in other words, is a highly dependent one, yet the enterprise has some 
degree of autonomy in the areas of technical learning and cost manage-
ment, and thus some control over its profitability. In many instances, 
however, even these areas are supervised by the parent firm. Yet, since 
healthy subcontractors are a goal of parent firms, a well run subcontrac-
tor can gain more autonomy and more business over time through good 
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purpose equipment so that the barriers to going to a different parent 
firm are low. This sets a competitive level to profits below which a 
parent may find it difficult to push its supplier for any sustained 
period of time. 
Most subcontracting enterprises begin with some form of patronage in 
the form of an initial sales base (and other technical and financial 
assistance). This "social asset," patronage, determines the real level 
of initial risk. It is not a long standing form of security, but it 
induces risk taking on the part of people with little means and modest 
skills. Insight into future development is a matter more of affinity 
with larger players than a product of independent calculation. How do 
start-ups occur? Apparently by a number of mechanisms: a manufacturing 
employee may be encouraged to set up as a supplier on his own; a trading 
firm or other go-between may encourage an individual to start out with a 
promise of initial business; or a parent firm may seek out an individual 
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in order to establish a needed supplier. Large firms put in a good deal 
of time develping new subcontracting links. In all such instances, 
relational qualities are prior and initially dominant, and the dependence 
of the subcontractor is high. 
Business growth brings with it greater autonomy and a shifting 
balance among the factors of production. Among manufacturing subcontrac-
tors with four to nine employees (located through social networks), only 
40 per cent report selling to only one parent firm, and a mere 20 per 
cent of those with 50-99 employees have only one main customer. On the 
other hand, the number of reported "parents" increases. Most larger 
subcontractors (say those in the 50-100 employee range) have succeeded in 
establishing themselves as integral elements of the manufacturing systems 
of four to eight larger parent firms. We must assume they achieved this 
position by their competence in a technology, their overall efficiency 
and their ability to integrate well with the needs of more than one 
parent firm. Along the way they have developed increased proprietary 
technology and capacities to protect or increase profitability. One form 
of this capacity is innovative cost reductions within longer term supply 
contracts. 
A process of growth and transformation can be seen in this pattern. 
Tiny subcontractors that master a technology and manage costs can grow as 
a result of the specialized competence they achieve. In time this can 
also mean they gain advantages based on the specialized production 
equipment they have invested in. In turn, these make the subcontractor 
more attractive to other parent companies. Growth also hinges on the 
successful management of increasingly complex labor, financial and other 
inputs. Accountability (for product and profits) has, in effect, been 
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shifted to the lowest levels of the production process. Every step is 
its own profit center and subject to the market. If performance is not 
satisfactory over time, there is no guarantee of continuing in business. 
Changes in technology or market demand can make a subcontractor obsolete. 
What is notable are the numerous instances in which a parent firm helps a 
subcontractor of basic worth to achieve greater efficiency or convert to 
supplying a different product. By growing and diversifying, subcontrac-
tors begin to manage more of the risk and attendant possibilities for 
gain themselves. 
Small subcontractors, like other smaller firms, do not offer long-
term security of employment and are much less inclined to offer special 
benefits. Flexibility in staffing (including a greater reliance on 
family and part-timers) and great caution in making any investments other 
than those for production equipment also characterize these firms. 
Attempting to gain autonomy quickly by engaging in new areas or by 
putting emphasis on independent sales is quite uncommon. The emphasis is 
on the development of production technology. On the "parent" side, the 
pattern is to cultivate a stable of strong subcontractors as a means of 
borrowing their strengths without incurring the fixed costs that doing 
the same work internally would entail. 
Large firms have unions that defend not only permanent employment, 
but a seniority based wage system and many benefits for both blue- and 
white collar employees. Large firms thus have rather inflexible labor 
costs and other fixed overhead costs. In many instances it takes them a 
long time to develop in-house expertise given their reluctance to hire 
mature skills on the open market. Such employment inflexibilities favor 
a major role for subcontracting. As the employee population of large 
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firms matures (a common phenomenon given both slower growth and the aging 
of the population as a whole), assembly firms adapt by increasing their 
subcontracting (as well as by automating and rearranging seniority pay). 
Since 1973 total manufacturing employment in Japan has dropped by about 
ten per cent and the proportion of manufacturing stemming from the small 
and medium sector had increased. Most of this rationalization thus 
appears to have come as large scale enterprises cut staff and add 
subcontracting. 
Retailing. The single largest category of SFEs in Japan is retail-
ing. Small stores comprise 29 per cent of all businesses with four or 
fewer workers; excluding agricultural households, the proportion of 
stores in the total rises to about 35 per cent. Indeed, most retail 
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stores are very small, with few workers and low sales per worker. 
Compared to other advanced industrial societies, Japan has far and away 
the highest number of retail outlets per capita, with nearly twice as 
many relative to population as the U.S., Germany, France or England, and 
Japanese productivity in distribution is low by international standards. 
Like agriculture, Japanese distribution appears to be seriously ineffi-
cient. Retailing is filled with "underemployed" workers who in other 
societies might well be unemployed. Finally, being so numerous, shop-
keepers are a significant political force. About as many families today 
own shops as own farms. If there is a populist focus in the next dec-
ade's electorate, it will be retailers. 
The distribution networks are complicated by extensive wholesaler 
chains, and in some industries by manufacturers who maintain exclusive 
dealerships that handle only their products. For example, of the some 
7,000 retail outlets selling consumer electronic goods, about 5,000 are 
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integrated into the exclusive distribution systems of particular manufac-
33 turers, referred to as "distribution keiretsu." They try to offset 
being undercut on price by high volume outlets such as department stores 
and discount houses by locational advantage, and by intensively providing 
repair and other services. 
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all stores have fewer than six workers. Sixty per cent have only one or 
two workers, implying that no one outside the family is involved. The 
place of very small stores in total retailing is slowly decreasing, yet 
it remains central to any discussion of Japanese small business. 
What patterns characterize family shops? Three quarters of one and 
two person operations are located in the family residence. Even among 
shops with between ten and 20 workers, 30 per cent of the owners live on 
the premises. In most instances husbands and wives work together. Most 
shops originate when the husband and/or wife are in their thirties or 
forties, the early thirties being the most common age. The usual intent 
is for the shop to be a long-term proposition. But a sizable minority 
(about one-quarter) is oriented initially to income production in the 
retirement years. In one large survey, 26 per cent of shopkeepers gave 
security in old age as a reason for having opened a store and ten per 
cent mentioned the impending retirement of the husband. If we add to 
this the unmarried and widowed women running shops (two to three per cent 
of the total), we can see the role of small retailing in personal plan-
ning for old age. Fully one-quarter of all owner-operators are over 
sixty years old. 
Although only one quarter of the listed owner-operators are female, 
surveys show that most wives put in long hours in the shop. Four out of 
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five of women operators are married, but their husbands tend to have 
other jobs. Women tend to run stores oriented to female customers. 
Entrepreneurship among middle-aged women is not uncommon. It is a means 
of supplementing family income preferred to low status part-time work for 
a large company. Given a solid base of social contacts as a customer 
base, female entrepreneurs are often in excellent positions to gradually 
build up small businesses while their husbands continue as wage earners. 
In the eventuality of considerable success, husbands may shift to manag-
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ing part of the wife's business. On the other hand, wives of shop-
keepers typically adjust the degree of their assistance to childrearing 
and housekeeping demands. The combination of spousal labor input shifts 
over the life-cycle, with business and family needs being periodically 
readjusted. The notable point is the great flexibility of the system as 
long as the SFE is part of the residential arrangement. Also, some 20 
per cent of married women working in family enterprises become wage-
earning employees elsewhere as their children grow up. 
Obviously the role of the store in total household income varies 
greatly. Surveys indicate that about half of the unincorporated stores 
(typically one to four workers) provide at least 50 per cent of the 
household income, while one-tenth of the smallest shops provide under ten 
per cent of the total. One competitive advantage is that small stores 
can and do keep long hours, while large store hours are legally restrict-
ed. Even so, only 20 per cent of such stores report utilizing part-time 
hired labor. 
The reported average gross sales for all unincorporated retail and 
wholesale operations in 1982 was about ¥21.5 million ($86,000). We 
assume that wholesale operations inflate this average, but underreporting 
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probably also deflates it. From this sales base, an annual average of 
¥3,462,000 ($13,848) net profit was reported earned in 1982. The 
profit/sales ratio of 15 per cent is before the "wages'1 of family workers 
are calculated. If we assume that on average one and a half family 
workers are engaged in the business and allocate the profits as labor 
income for the year, the return would come to about ¥700 or $2.80 per 
hour (assuming ten hours a day, 330 days a year). This return is some-
what above wages paid female part timers by large firms and farther above 
those paid by the smaller firms in which women are more likely to find 
employment. An implicit hourly wage of ¥550 would leave only $2,950 as 
return to capital and entrepreneurial profits. However, sales and net 
income are typically underestimated substantially, and our assumptions 
may overstate the actual hours of work. No clear judgment can be made. 
Estimates of the efficiency or inefficiency of distribution in Japan 
obviously rest on the value of the labor input in family based retailing. 
Is the high quality service but low value added the retail industry's 
analogue to a technically efficient but economically inefficient system 
of agriculture (with far higher subsidization of output and incomes in 
the latter)? 
A calculation of the actual return to owner-operators is complicated 
by other factors: (1) the household residence (or part of it) is carried 
as a business expense, (2) shop goods may be an unaccounted form of 
income, (3) sales and profits may be underreported for tax purposes (the 
average total tax payment for all unincorporated wholesale and retail 
establishments was only ¥182,000 ($728) annually, and most of this was 
probably paid by the larger unincorporated businesses in the sample), (4) 
the purpose of some stores may be more to protect claims on land and to 
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maintain advantageous property tax arrangements than to generate current 
income, and (5) an important objective may be to continue the present 
occupation and way of life, as long as income remains at a comfortable 
level. 
Surveys find that roughly half of all shops were founded by their 
present manager-owners, while the rest were inherited. Eighty-five per 
cent of the successors are family or relatives, the remainder former 
employees. The buying or selling of retail businesses is not common, and 
one in five owners say they do not intend the shop to continue past their 
tenure, giving as reasons the low status of the work and declining sales 
and income. Indeed, there probably is little of value to sell other than 
the land itself. Another 30 per cent would like to see their stores 
remain in operation, but as yet have no successor. An interesting 
pattern is that children are not raised to succeed to the shop, but are 
encouraged to set their sights on higher education and employment in 
larger firms. Yet, as the parents reach their late fifties and early 
sixties, succession becomes a serious issue and some children do return. 
Why the High Proportion of Small Businesses? 
The preceding description has suggested various explanations for 
Japan1s relatively high proportion of small businesses, a subject to 
which we now turn. Two caveats are in order. First, any hypothesis here 
is in principle comparative and properly should be considered through 
careful investigation of leading Western economies; however, comparative 
data and studies are slim at best, so our comparisons are unfortunately 
more implicit than explicit. Second, satisfactory explanations will 
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differ by economic sector and by particular industry. Many useful 
generalizations have inevitable exceptions. 
We propose a broad, syncretic model (or framework) through which to 
understand small-scale family enterprise behavior and performance. It is 
a model of demand and supply, but includes more than the standard factor 
and output markets. The small enterpriser has his own mixture of skills, 
labor, ownership of land and capital, network of social connections, and 
entrepreneurial drive and ambition. He utilizes family resources, and 
hires resources (labor, capital, land) in factor markets. A market niche 
is essential to sell his product. Friends and relatives are the tradi-
tional and most important form and source of venture capital, social as 
well as financial. We probably cannot overestimate the importance of 
social networks and personal contacts—the conveying of information and 
the conferring of patronage—in making markets function effectively for 
SFEs. That many markets—for sales and for inputs--are mediated by 
personal and social relationships implies that long-term contacts (im-
plicit or explicit) are the main way of doing business for Japanese SFEs. 
All this takes place in a changing external environment shaped by general 
economic conditions, government policies, and Japan's cultural heritage. 
We examine these factors in successive parts of this section. 
We assume small-scale enterprises and their workers behave rational-
ly in the classical economic sense: they have a pretty good sense of 
their own self-interest and try to maximize it. However, self-interest 
is neither entirely individualistic nor entirely materialistic (i.e. 
maximization of income and wealth over some life cycle)-, it is largely 
defined in the context of the family's well-being. Survey data suggest 
that Japanese start their own enterprises for a wide range of reasons— 
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not just to obtain a job or to generate income and wealth; but to be 
one's own boss; to utilize and develop one's own perceived talents, 
knowledge, and skills; to utilize existing assets (experience, land, 
connections, etc.); to capitalize on existing networks as well as to 
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and so forth. They also choose to stay in economically marginal busi-
nesses that for reasons that reflect the importance of other satisfac-
tions; frequently mentioned are the social ties in an industry and a 
neighborhood. 
The substantial and persisting differences between smaller and 
larger production units in output, real capital, and wages per worker 
have presented an ongoing analytical puzzle for understanding the struc-
ture and performance of the Japanese economy. Terms such as "dual 
economy," "dual structure" and "differential structure" have become 
value-laden phrases which incorporate a number of stereotypes and myths. 
They imply the exploitation by large firms of cheap labor located in 
smaller firms through factor market imperfections; and they imply that 
the persistence of smaller firms is primarily a "lagged" consequence of 
technical, educational and financial imbalances in a rapidly changing 
economy and society. The inequalities, in other words, are neither 
voluntary nor efficient. The symbiotic rise of subcontracting in manu-
facturing in the postwar period has in the past been explained mainly in 
terms of these market imperfections and scale differentials. In the 
postwar era of rapid growth "unskilled labor surplus" dualism gave way to 
big business capitalism that shares oligopolistic rents derived from 
superior technology ai^ d relatively cheap capital with unionized regular 
(male) employees. The small-scale sector was seen as the passive but 
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flexible absorber of redundant or less qualified labor, which in order to 
exist offset limited access to and expensive cost of capital (even 
adjusted for default risk) and lesser command over technology by the 
payment of even cheaper wages (relative to labor quality). 
In our view, "economic dualism11 has become an outmoded phrase 
because the underlying economic conditions which determined the terms of 
the dual structure analysis in the past have changed substantially over 
the past two decades. We see on the one hand an erosion of traditional 
dualistic features, but on the other hand new kinds of imperfections 
becoming more important. We also find great economic interdependence 
among small, medium, and large enterprises, and increasingly comple.x 
interactions in the sphere of public economic policy. Interdependence 
goes far beyond the subcontracting relationships in manufacturing or the 
sales networks linking retailers, wholesalers, and producers; it perme-
ates in the standard input-output sense of inter-industry relations. 
Further, as well as producing its own products, each category of enter-
prise generates labor and profit income used to purchase the products of 
others. 
To succeed, the small-scale entrepreneur must have certain special 
assets to produce specific goods or services, and a market in which to 
sell them. In some output markets he has to compete both with SFEs of 
his own size and with much larger firms which are likely to have superior 
technology, superior access to labor skills and cheap capital, or other 
inputs which make them cost competitive. Larger Japanese firms, on the 
other hand, often choose to work with rather than compete directly with 
smaller firms in a wide range of activities. This is part of the phenom-
enon of competition across groups in which competing larger firms 
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organize sets of medium and smaller firms in manufacturing and, to a 
lesser extent, in retailing. We find that most smaller enterprisers work 
in a complex but generally supportive economic, sociocultural, and 
political environment in which most competition is between enterprises of 
similar scale. While we attempt to generalize, we must always recall 
that we are dealing with a huge number of specific micro contexts, with 
persons of differing and on occasion idiosyncratic characteristics, and 
that random events (luck or stochastic processes, depending upon onefs 
way of perceiving destiny) often are important determinants of outcomes. 
The unusually large number of Japanese SFEs is a product of numerous 
factors that appear in degree to distinguish the Japanese situation. 
Entrepreneurship: Historical, Social and Cultural Perspectives. The 
long standing proportion and centrality of small businesses to the 
economy is itself a basic, if tautological, consideration. There is no 
better nursery for small business than being raised in a small business 
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environment. Small-scale farming, family entrepreneurship and business 
networking are not recent developments, and yet in many nations they have 
not adapted well to modern requirements; Japanfs adaptation of these 
social forms to the requirements of a modern economy is notable. Fur-
thermore, despite the draining off of a large per centage of the working 
population into large organizations with higher status, the pool of 
entrepreneurs has apparently not diminished. In the midst of this 
century's rapid and profound sectoral shifts, the small scale element has 
remained, as the children of farmers, artisans and shopkeepers have 
populated manufacturing and new service industries. 
How Japan produces its petit bourgeoisie is worth noting. The 
crucial points include the near absence of sociocultural barriers and the 
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large supply of people who have small business experience before they are 
thirty. Japan has very few minorities and they find niches in special-
ized small businesses. Ethnicity is not a barrier to them in small 
business, only in large. 
The average Japanese is also highly educated by cross-national 
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standards. Insufficient education can be a significant barrier to the 
generation of small businesses, especially in an advanced economy where 
such characteristics as illiteracy, poor work habits, or an inability to 
grasp technological or business complexities preclude successful entre-
preneurship. The high average level of education in Japan assures the 
society a large pool of well trained potential entrepreneurs and helps 
explain the relatively small per centage of incompetent ("unemployable") 
workers in the labor pool. This benefits small business. Since educa-
tional performance is an important means to the realization of career 
aspirations, the educational system, especially at the high school level, 
serves to sort out career options and to shape expectations. Concurrent-
ly, family characteristics (occupation, educational level, income level) 
and personalities play a strong role in defining options. 
Welfare and employment policies that increase insecurity about old 
age also play a role by (1) encouraging self-help, (2) inducing workers 
to work even for low wages, and (3) causing people to view entrepreneur-
ship as a means to greater security in retirement. Big businesses do not 
hire mid-career job changers and their early retirement programs throw 
out many people who continue to work. The still limited level of govern-
ment as well as private retirement benefits have, thus far at least, 
offered relatively little income security even for the retired employees 
of large firms. (See, however, the chapter by Bronfenbrenner and 
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Yasuba). The extension of life expectancy and the reduction of three 
generation families due to urbanization are parallel trends that add to 
the overall level of insecurity, an insecurity that motivates participa-
tion in the small business sector since there is nowhere else to go. 
Social Networks 
Social connections (relatives, friends, former schoolmates, former 
employers, industry colleagues and neighbors) are an important means of 
minimizing the costs of information and of reducing the uncertainties of 
unreliability, incompetence, or fraud. In Japan social relationships are 
regularly mentioned as key ingredients of start-up businesses. They 
provide the initial demand for a product or service, and they help secure 
other assets. Patronage of this sort also can provide capital or access 
to it, access to markets, and access to others with needed connections. 
Even as the small enterpriser seeks independence, he or she is often very 
dependent upon the personal good will and support of others. Personal 
networks are an economic asset assiduously built up by enterprisers. 
What distinguishes Japan in all this is the regularity with which social 
networking and small business interact for such large segments of the 
population. Just as jobs very often are not allocated solely by imper-
sonal processes, so business opportunities, small-scale investments, and 
other assistance are channeled along social networks. Where small 
enterprise is an accepted framework for new developments, it is common-
place for social networks to provide assets and opportunities that 
increase their vitality. These social assets alone are not sufficient to 
generate business success. Without good service and a competitive price, 
personal relations and connections alone cannot enable many small 
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businesses to survive, but they enhance the opportunity to compete in 
particular niches. 
Market niches are the sine qua non for most small businesses and 
specialization is the adaptive response. As discussed above, many 
traditional manufactures are conducted by clusters of tiny symbiotic 
units, each occupying a functional role in processes which elsewhere 
might fall under the roof of a single firm. In retailing and wholesal-
ing, small operators typically occupy either locational niches or differ-
entiate themselves by products in ways that make them competitive in ways 
other than price alone. For many services locational advantages are very 
important; so too is customized, personalized service, and, indeed, a 
high level of customer service. The demand for certain types of "custom-
ized" products is also worth noting (components for ambulances, for 
example). Small producers can also achieve efficiencies of scale by long 
production runs of a single item, such as eyes for fishing rods, or hands 
and dial faces for wristwatches. In consumer markets, local brand 
differentiation has always been important, especially in food products. 
The point here is that as prosperity encourages increased social complex-
ity, it creates opportunities that can be met by small scale entrepre-
neurs if they are available and barriers to entry are not prohibitive. 
On the other hand, new products have transformed some industries to the 
acute disadvantage of SFE producers; Coca Cola, for example, replaced 
hundreds of small local bottlers. 
Finally, there is no question that as an economic unit and a nexus 
for human social relations, the cooperative, working household (ie) is a 
deep seated part of Japanese culture. Not only is it a product of 
Japan's Confucian heritage and hundreds of years of ideological emphasis 
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as the key metaphor for Japanese morality, but modern popular media have 
regularly idealized the small, family run business as the place where 
work and human affection can find a proper balance. Japanese culture and 
history provide fundamental patterns of thought, value and action that 
encourage small business. Such issues are difficult, at best, to deal 
with on a comparative basis, and we suggest only that without such a base 
of positive factors, the number and vitality of SFEs in Japan would be 
less. Together, these cultural and historical factors add a dimensional 
richness to the significant economic factors supportive of a vigorous 
small-scale family enterprise sector. 
The foregoing set of considerations suggest the hypothesis that 
Japan will continue to generate a comparatively large proportion of small 
businesses simply by virtue of its history and sociocultural patterns, 
and that only where larger scale production is more efficient and compet-
itively superior and government protection insufficient will the share of 
small scale activities decline. Japanese do not enter small business 
with an expectation of failure, nor are they only in business to make a 
better return than their skills would earn in the employ of larger firms. 
They are in small businesses and patronizing small businesses by choice, 
and this preference has a foundation in historical patterns as well as in 
economic opportunity. 
Support, albeit quite untestable, for this hypothesis comes from the 
fact that, despite enormous economic transformation, small business 
activity has not substantially decreased in the postwar era. As agricul-
ture has declined, small scale activities and employment in manufacturing 
and services have grown proportionally. The immense productivity gains 
in manufacturing have been responsible for overall growth and now quite 
40 
high levels of income, and thus have supported the employment shift 
between the primary and other sectors. The role of small scale manufac-
turing has not diminished in the course of productivity growth within the 
manufacturing sector. In no other advanced industrial nation has this 
occurred, and this leads to questions (alternative hypotheses) of a more 
particular kind regarding factor market efficiencies (especially in 
manufacturing) and, of course, government protection. 
Factor Markets. The basic structure, and evolving characteristics, 
of markets for labor, capital (finance), and land in certain ways provide 
both opportunities and obstacles for small-scale family enterprises. 
Labor markets and wage differentials by firm size have been studied 
voluminously, since they are a core themes in the dual structure analy-
sis. The higher cost and lesser availability of finance for small firms 
relative to large have received less attention, and the nature and 
implications of the markets for land and rights to its use have scarcely 
been analyzed at all. 
We cannot analyze any of these markets in detail here; fortunately, 
labor markets and financial markets are treated in the chapters by Koike, 
and Horiuchi and Hamada. Nonetheless, we do have a point of view about 
the special effect of each of these factor markets on SFEs in Japan 
today. They can be stated, rather baldly, in the following three 
hypotheses. 
(1) Certain wage differentials do provide a special opportunity for 
SFEs, but not in the labor markets usually analyzed; rather, 
special pools of abundant, productive, low wage labor are 
available—notably middle-aged married females, workers over 55 
separated (retired) from larger firms; workers desiring 
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part-time employment, and workers in remote or inconvenient 
locales. 
(2) Any higher costs of capital (borrowed funds) to SFEs now 
reflect essentially only differences in default risk, collater-
al, and transactions costs; the historic high interest rate 
differential in excess of competitive costs has now 
disappeared. 
(3) SFE access to land through ownership or long-term lease at 
below-market rental rates provides a special opportunity, given 
the widespread distribution of land ownership and tenant 
rights, both urban and rural. 
Labor 
A great de$l of attention has been devoted to explaining the very 
substantial differentials in wages, bonuses and fringe benefits for male 
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employees by firm size—the Japanese dual labor market. Earlier 
explanations centered on labor market imperfections, notably the large 
firm industrial relations system of entry-level hiring, so-called perma-
nent employment, and seniority-based promotion and wage increases 
(nenko). Paternalistic or other non-economic reasons were given for the 
creation and development of these institutions and "culture" was invoked 
without specifying variables or causal mechanisms. 
Others have sought more direct economic explanations of the phenome-
non. Several neoclassically-based theoretical arguments have been 
advanced, though so far empirical testing has been limited. There is 
evidence that part of the increasing wage differential with seniority is 
payment for investment (by large firms and their workers) in the develop-
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ment of firm-specific skills needed for particular technologies. A 
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second argument, supported by the extensive use of entrance examinations 
and interviews for the hiring of both blue-collar and white-collar new 
entrants, is that large firms select the more able and better motivated 
within each educational-level cohort; accordingly, unequal pay reflects 
unequal quality even after adjustment is made for education, age, occupa-
tion, industry, and gender. A more recent theoretical contribution is 
that large firms have greater monitoring costs to keep workers motivated 
and prevent them from shirking on the job--and one way to monitor is to 
42 pay higher wages and to get rid of those caught shirking. Further, a 
considerable amount of research shows that there is more turnover than 
the stereotype implies, with considerable differences by age, education, 
and status. 
A quite different strand of analysis emphasizes that almost all the 
Japanese empirical research is limited to comparisons of male regular 
employees in large and small firms, while the significant wage differen-
tials are the consequences of discrimination, especially against women, 
older persons, and ethnic minority groups. Discrimination occurs at 
three sequentially more subtle levels: entry-level wages for the same or 
comparable work; occupational segmentation and exclusion; and institu-
tionally generated differential access to opportunities to develop on-
the-job skills. 
With rapid growth, changing industrial structure, higher produc-
tivity and wage levels, and increasing levels of education, labor market 
conditions have evolved considerably on both the demand and supply sides. 
The steepness of seniority-age wage profiles has flattened somewhat. 
Over time the wage gap by firm size for average workers comparable in 
age, education, gender, and experience has narrowed for all age groups so 
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that the difference now is only about ten per cent (except for older 
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workers). Therefore, the much larger gap in actual average wage is due 
to heterogeneity of labor within a common base, and to a substantial 
degree of labor noncomparability between large firms and small. Small 
firms disproportionately hire less educated, female, or older workers, 
and those who were doing less well at school at whatever level they left 
to enter the labor force. Starting wages are now higher in small firms 
than in large ones in all sectors, but wage increments and lifetime 
earnings are substantially lower. 
Kazuo Koike argues in this volume that Japan1s labor markets are not 
44 dualistic, at least no more so than those of Western Europe. He 
asserts that the Japanese pattern of wage differentials for male employ-
ees of comparable age, education and experience by firm size removes the 
Western European pattern except for blue collar male workers, and that 
the blue collar differential is due to the even greater on-the-job 
training that male workers receive in large Japanese firms. He also 
argues that male workers are paid more than female workers in all firm 
sizes because of greater skills developed through on-the-job training. 
For Koike, Japan1s labor markets are neoclassical: wage differentials 
reflect skill and hence productivity differentials. 
A different approach asserts that oligopolistic large firms pay 
higher wages than required in order to maintain labor peace and good 
relations with the enterprise union. Large firms earn quasirents through 
technological prowess and, in some industries, through the exercise of 
market power; employees capture part of those rents through union power. 
In a bargaining process (see the chapter by Aoki) profits are allocated 
by management to employees, major (financial) institutional stockholders 
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and financiers, and individual stockholders. Permanent, regular (predom-
inantly male) employees receive seniority-related high wages and bonuses, 
extensive fringe benefits, large lump-sum retirement benefits, and 
shorter working hours for which, in turn, they work reasonably hard, 
develop skills assiduously, propose improvements, and maintain labor 
peace. 
By screening out certain groups and retiring workers early (before 
they want or can afford to stop working), the employment practices of 
large firms create large pools of certain kinds of labor available at 
lower wage rates. Deeply embedded institutional rigidities in hiring, 
firing, and retiring result in de facto occupational, promotion, and 
career segregation, which is reinforced—particularly in the case of 
females--by social values and the socialization of women. 
Two major pools of underutilized labor are thereby created: middle-
aged, married females who reenter the labor force after years away for 
bearing and rearing children , and males over age 55 who have been forced 
to retire from large firms but continue working. A third category 
overlaps these two groups, namely those seeking part-time employment and 
scheduling flexibility. Many part-timers are middle-aged women or older 
workers, but college students and younger women with small children also 
participate. Smaller pools of labor are also tapped, including persons 
residing in less developed (lower wage) rural regions and minority ethnic 
groups. It is the very heterogeneity of labor supply, combined with 
institutional rigidities in the education, socialization, and large firm 
employment systems, that provides SFEs access to relatively low-wage 
labor. 
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However, the essential issue is not low wage rates per se, but that 
for several reasons productivity differentials are narrower than wage 
differentials. On the supply side, holding quality constant, the prefer-
ences of workers, their age, gender, geographic location, and other 
characteristics do not match fully the large employer demand for labor. 
The large firm screening and retention process is not perfect: certain 
types of labor are screened out, or cast out, regardless of ability; and 
of course others are mistakenly hired. There are a wide range of tasks 
where ascriptive variables such as education, age, or even intelligence 
probably have only modest correlation with productivity. To be on the 
safe side, large firms may simply overpay for certain attributes since 
they find it difficult to measure individual productivity. (In contrast 
SFEs are likely to have a much better sense of individual capabilities 
and productivity.) For many labor-intensive jobs such as assembly 
operations, skills are learned relatively easily and quickly. The large 
employerfs rationale for retiring older workers at a relatively early 
age, given health and projected life spans, is that the seniority wage 
structure makes them very expensive relative to their current productivi-
ty. Yet older workers do not lose all their skills, nor do those skills 
become fully obsolete, when they retire from large firms and move into 
small ones. Moreover, labor laws (including fringe benefit requirements) 
are not seriously applied to SFEs. While wage rates of other workers on 
average are much lower than those in the 50-55 age group, this may be a 
problem of composition; few old persons work in large firms. Lower wages 
no doubt reflect lower productivity, but tasks assigned to older workers 
may not take full advantage of their skills. This is a topic which will 
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be of increasing importance as, with the aging of Japan, there are more 
and more working old persons. 
More attention has focused recently on the large wage differentials 
between males and females, especially in the 30-55 age group. Middle-
aged married females reentering the labor force are paid about the same 
as young single females. The female/male wage differential (54.1 per 
cent in 1981) is far greater than in other industrial countries; the 
ratio (1980) is 66 per cent in the United States and 70-90 per cent in 
45 Western Europe. Koike!s explanation that this is due to differences in 
skill based on experience is not fully satisfying, in part because women 
are never provided the opportunity to develop appropriate skills. 
Moreover, Yashiro found that 54 per cent of the female/male wage differ-
entials was due to human capital (46.8 per cent to work experience, 7.2 
per cent to educational level), leaving an unexplained residual of 46 per 
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cent. Kawashima has addressed these issues directly. She analyzes 
blue-collar and white-collar wages in concentrated industries in terms of 
worker characteristics (such as education and work experience) and labor 
market structure (sex discrimination). She finds that sex discrimination 
is very important: for blue-collar female workers it explains 78 per 
cent of the wage differential in competitive sectors and 65 per cent in 
concentrated sectors, and for white-collar female workers 28 per cent in 
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competitive sectors and 86 per cent in concentrated sectors. 
While there are more women working full time than part time in all 
age categories, women comprise 93 per cent of all part-time workers, more 
than half (55 per cent) of them in the 35-54 age group. Labor costs of 
part-time workers to employers, overwhelmingly SFEs, are much lower than 
for full-time workers. For example, in 1980 a woman working six hours 
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per day received an hourly wage rate 24 per cent below that of a compara-
48 ble full-time worker. Moreover, part-time employees receive little, if 
anything, in bonuses and fringe benefits and require less in employer 
social security contributions. Women constitute a vast reservoir of 
low-cost labor. While more than half of married women work, more than 
eight million women (and 2 million men) not employed desire to work 
(mainly part time), though most are not actively seeking a job and do not 
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show up in unemployment statistics. Most housewives are motivated by 
straightforward economic goals: to supplement household income, to 
support the household, and to add to savings. Personal development and 
career goals are not strong motivations. 
In our view, labor market discrimination, broadly defined, against 
women and older persons has replaced labor market dualism as the main 
source of low-cost productive labor. Small firms, especially in manufac-
turing and services, have responded flexibly to these labor market 
opportunities. Their ability to locate and utilize cheap yet productive 
labor continues to be one of their most important advantages over large 
employers. Nonetheless two points must be emphasized. First, these 
labor market interactions must be viewed in the dynamic context of 
changes both in supply and demand; basic market forces push toward a 
narrowing of wage differentials commensurate with skill and productivity 
differentials. It is no accident that large firms in fairly labor-
intensive activities are beginning to hire substantial numbers of middle-
aged, female, part-time workers. Second, it is not by cheap labor alone 
that Japanese SFEs survive, and even prosper. They must offer quality 
products and responsiveness to markets and customers as well as be price 
competitive. They require a core of skilled workers, beginning with the 
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owner/operator, who assume the technical and business responsibilities of 
the operation. Wages and opportunities for core skilled workers are of a 
different order. If low labor costs were the dominant explanation for 
most small businesses, then large-scale producers would rely much more on 
offshore subcontracting based on truly cheap labor, and imports of labor 
intensive goods would be substantially greater. 
Capital. The second major factor market the small enterpriser faces 
is the capital market. Until recently small enterprises had to pay 
higher interest rates than large ones and they had less access to 
finance. This situation is not unique to Japan, of course. Two facts 
stand out: most loans to small enterprises have been backed by collater-
al, typically land, and until recently interest rate differentials were 
substantially greater than transactions costs and risk premiums would 
warrant. The degree of the differential depended on the degree of 
institutional development and the tightness of funds; the system of 
segmented financial markets allocated credit preferentially to larger 
firms in a quite competitive top-tier market while small enterprises 
52 tended to face oligopolistic lenders. 
However, over the past decade conditions have changed more in 
finance than in virtually any other market in Japan, as the chapters by 
Sato and by Horiuchi and Hamada make clear. As a result, financial 
institutions awash with relatively low-cost funds and facing inadequate 
customer demand now actively seek small as well as large borrowers. In 
addition, government financial institution loan programs have been 
vigorously redirected to small business; as of December 1983, loans 
outstanding to small business from these two sources alone amounted to 
about $20.7 billion and $19.4 billion respectively. More importantly, 
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total loans to small business amounted to $676 billion; and the share of 
small business in the total loans of the financial system increased 
sharply from 43.0 per cent in 1963 to 58.9 per cent in 1983. 
These changes have dramatically improved the access to and cost 
conditions for borrowed funds for almost all small enterprises, particu-
larly those with some land or other real collateral. This leads to our 
basic proposition: there is now no substantial discrimination in finan-
cial markets against small enterprises once adjustment is made for 
transactions costs and risk. 
That does not mean that all small enterprisers have ready access to 
borrowed funds, or that the great importance of trading companies as a 
major source of external funds (often in the form of goods to be pro-
cessed) has substantially diminished. In Japan as elsewhere the capital 
for new small-scale start-ups comes overwhelmingly from family savings, 
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and borrowing from relatives, friends, and patrons. Early growth is 
financed by retained profits and further personal infusions. Only after 
a SFE has developed at least a brief track record is it likely to be able 
to borrow significantly from a financial institution. Accordingly, the 
unreported but very real assets of land ownership, personal networks, and 
individual qualities and skills of the small-scale enterpriser count very 
heavily in establishing and maintaining a business. 
Land. The widespread distribution of both urban and rural land has 
endowed many families with a physically small but very valuable, increas-
ingly high priced asset. Land is by far the most important asset of 
those families which happen—by history, circumstance, or wise investment 
—to own land. The redistribution of farmland to tenants in the postwar 
land reform and the ongoing legal difficulties in recombining farm land 
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into larger units are the most important reasons for the persistence of 
such a large number of family farmers. Land-owning urban households use 
most of their land for their residential purposes. At the same time, the 
land and house become an asset to exploit for business purposes, a major 
and seriously underreported form of investment input into very small 
businesses. Thus, in 1978 some 2.4 million homes were also used as 
stores and other commercial establishments. A high proportion (78.8 per 
cent) of the self-employed owned homes, and presumably most use these as 
a base of operations. Many small industrial and commercial enterprises 
probably obtain their viability through the high implicit rent (in 
opportunity cost terms) accruing on the land rather than substantial 
productivity of labor or capital inputs. These "rents" show up as SFE 
income attributed in part to their labor inputs; part is probably bid 
away through the competitively determined sales prices of SFE goods or 
services to their customers. 
However, ownership of land is by no means the full story. Tenants 
have very strong rights: in urban areas land for business use often is 
under long-term (20-30 year) contract; under the Civil Code tenants have 
vested rights and cannot be forced out; any rent increases have to be 
mutually acceptable. As a consequence, rental payments are very low 
where tenants have long been incumbent. Land reform and tenant rights 
have virtually eliminated land rental in agriculture and have seriously 
inhibited land consolidation for farming purposes. In urban areas much 
land, in ever smaller plots, is under lease. Frequently the ownership of 
a building is separate from that of the land on which it stands, which 
the owner leases out. Thus, tenant user rights have become very valu-
able, between 40-70 per cent of the total land value in urban areas (the 
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Tokyo ratio is apparently on the order of 70 per cent), and the capital 
(market) value and rental income of land ownership, where rented out, is 
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correspondingly lower. Thus, SFEs that have tenant rights (the more 
long-standing the better) also hold a valuable asset. 
In a pure world of neoclassical equilibrium, these rents and 
quasirents would be capitalized, the land sold and put into its most 
efficient use. Why does this occur only very slowly? In part it is a 
matter of life styles and generational changes in tastes; operating a 
small business out of one's home may be more efficient than simply using 
it as a residence. Part has to do with the complementarity of family 
land ownership and family labor. Women can work at home, on their own 
schedules (in some occupations) and with greater flexibility than would 
be possible working elsewhere as wage-earners. Or specific labor skills 
complementary to land ownership may be developed, as for example with 
small wholesalers. But why not retire, sell land or tenant rights to its 
use at a high price, use part to buy an apartment, and live comfortably 
on the income from the remainder? There are good reasons: capital gains 
taxes on land sales (let onefs inheritors take care of the happy problem 
of land wealth); low returns to depositors in Japan's financial markets; 
and the various tax advantages of maintaining or strengthening potential 
claims on land. Indeed, Japanese seem to respond quite rationally in 
ways to protect their claim on land ownership or tenancy. Family resi-
dences and other land used for business purposes receive favorable tax 
treatment, especially at times of transfer at death of owner; it may well 
be wealth-maximizing to have Obaasan (Granny) running a tiny store which 
generates virtually no value-added or income. 
52 
We hypothesize that land—its highly dispersed ownership, tenant 
rights to its use, its high price, its role as the main source of wealth 
for most land-owning families, its security as an asset—is an important 
reason why there are so many small-scale enterprises, and especially why 
they will tend to persist longer than income and value-added measures of 
economic efficiency would imply. To some undetermined degree, high 
implicit land rent compensates for inefficiency in labor and capital use, 
and makes it possible for the SFE to stay alive or even do reasonably 
well. Indeed, it is empirically very difficult to know when and to what 
degree entrepreneurial drive counts for more than inherited ownership of 
land. 
At the same time, while ownership of land or tenant rights make it 
easier for a small business to become established and to remain in 
business, apparently it is not a serious barrier to new entry. New SFEs 
seem to be able to find space at affordable rents. We find this surpris-
ing given the reported high values of land. Land markets are clearly 
quite imperfect; they are constrained by legal and customary restrictions 
on rights, subject to considerable fragmentation, affected by tax regula-
tions, and probably involve all kinds of special deals and arrangements. 
Land values, markets, and use are one of the puzzles of Japan's political 
economy. 
We do not mean to imply by this discussion of factor markets that 
small-scale enterprise involves an optimal or even efficient allocation 
of economic resources. A major issue is the optimum scale of production, 
organization, or marketing. Indivisibilities of physical capital, 
technology, and managerial abilities in many products mean that economies 
of scale overwhelm the advantages of small-scale production. While lower 
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labor productivity and wages may be due substantially to labor heteroge-
neity, that certainly is not the whole explanation. As we have stressed 
many small entrepreneurs have taken advantage of their own areas of 
competitive advantage, and have responded creatively to (and thereby 
ameliorated) specific inefficiencies in the Japanese system as a 
whole—imperfect land markets, differential government legislation and 
its implementation, labor market discrimination and local conditions, 
institutional and bureaucratic rigidities of large firms and their system 
of industrial relations, and so on. 
Many other SFEs have responded defensively to situations of inexora-
bly declining economic competitiveness. Examples include most of agri-
culture, much labor-intensive manufacturing of standardized products 
subject to strong import competition, and many varieties of small retail-
ers faced with large store competition. For some it is a matter of 
living off the continuing but declining rents of their ownership of land, 
machinery and specific skills. Others adjust. Mom and pop stores join 
franchise convenience chains, and small producers shift to new products 
or change businesses entirely (using the same location and labor). But 
others, especially when there is generational change, simply go out of 
business and convert their assets in land and building to rental income. 
The Political Economy of Government Policy 
The very large number of small businesses make them potentially of 
55 great significance to the electoral process. Unlike white-collar 
voters, but like farmers, small entrepreneurs (and their families and 
employees) are very sensitive to particular economic issues and quite 
capable of voting single issue concerns. That is, business self-interest 
is a paramount factor. On the other hand, and quite unlike agriculture, 
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the diversity of interests in the small business sector is enormous. 
There are over 50,000 industrial associations representing small busi-
nesses in diverse industries and localities. The political potential of 
small businesses is only realized on a national scale when unity is 
forged around general issues. The government naturally seeks to avoid 
activating such issues. 
Small scale entrepreneurs are inherently pragmatic and their inter-
ests are often local. As businessmen they may be rather conservative on 
most issues, but they are quite capable of supporting local opposition 
party candidates who respond to their particular needs. They also are 
responsive to the criticism that the LDP favors big business, a regular 
opposition party theme; however, it is best to view the small business 
vote as inherently independent. 
Interests combine and can become politically influential under 
several types of circumstances: (1) when inclusive issues such as taxes, 
labor policies, or environmental protection are raised in a manner that 
adversely affect the small business sector as a whole, (2) when sectors 
of small business decline and seek protection, and (3) when localities 
seek particular economic benefits. 
The government avoids raising general issues by assuming a hands-off 
administrative posture. Tax laws, minimum wage legislation, and 
environmental and labor standards, in particular, are stringently applied 
to large firms, whereas smaller enterprises are rarely subject to scruti-
ny. In the case of health and sanitary inspections, a massive and 
successful lobbying effort to preserve quasiautonomy was launched by a 
consortium of small business associations when administrative incursions 
increased. In cities, furthermore, zoning laws that would inhibit small 
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business activity are seldom proposed. Further, the government can 
rarely enforce its depression cartel limitations on the production of 
smaller firms. Comparatively speaking, the government follows this 
approach to small business for reasons both of politics and of adminis-
trative efficiency. In this respect, Japan seems like Italy, and appears 
to be in direct contrast to the United States where small business finds 
onerous the imposition of a plethora of hiring, safety, environmental, 
and other regulations and regulatory agencies. The relatively large size 
of the small business sector means that a comparatively larger part of 
the Japanese economy escapes significant government involvement, the 
reverse of recent international ideas about Japanese industrial policy 
and its influence in directing the economy. 
The greatest, though most invisible, form of government support for 
small-scale family enterprises relative to large corporations is through 
the very lenient tax treatment of their personal and corporate incomes. 
The law provides substantial benefits for smallness, most notably the 
deduction as expenses of wages paid to family members in both incorporat-
ed and unincorporated enterprises without requiring tax withholding so 
long as annual wage income is below the personal exemption level. 
Moreover, reporting requirements are lax. Most important perhaps (it is 
impossible to know), the opportunities for and exercise of tax evasion by 
SFEs are substantial. We presume that most SFEs with income above 
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minimum statutory levels underreport net income and evade taxes. 
We infer an implicit political decision (within the LDP, not the 
Ministry of Finance) to tolerate widespread tax evasion by SFEs, with 
only modest efforts of rectification through audits and punishment of tax 
evaders. There is an implicit political exchange: support us and we 
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won't tax you. This arrangement was probably not conceived of in such 
terms initially, but simply emerged as small business grew, prospered, 
and become an increasing source of financial support for local politi-
cians and their leaders. Few politicians are willing to alter the 
present tacit agreement. The passage (and then unprecedented revocation) 
of legislation to tax interest income and the evasion of these taxes 
through illegal multiplication of interest-free deposit accounts (the 
"green card11 system of personal identification) is an excellent case 
study of the political pressures exercised by small busineeses among 
others. 
Inevitably data on tax evasion are fragmentary and not readily 
available. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun ran an informative series of arti-
cles between May 1983 and May 1984 from which the following information 
is derived. While 88.4 per cent of wage-earners paid income tax (through 
withholding), only 39.5 per cent of the heads of nonfarm unincorporated 
enterprises and only 14.6 per cent of farm household heads did. Of the 
1.75 million corporations, 1.1. million showed a loss or otherwise paid 
no corporate income tax. Indeed, many of the self-employed are not 
legally required to keep books, and they do not file tax returns. The 
chances of a serious audit are small: one in 25 for farmers and other 
self-employed persons, one in ten for a corporation (less for very small 
corporations). More than a third of the enterprises in the following 
categories audited in 1981 and 1982 had seriously understated tax re-
turns: bars (53 per cent), pachinko parlors, sushi-ya, moneylenders, 
fish stores, realtors, construction, coffee houses, gravel landfills, 
foreign food restaurants, souvenir sellers, love hotels. The average 
amount evaded ranged between $12,000-$65,0G0. The extensive use of cash 
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in settlement of transactions makes evasion difficult to trace. Tax 
audits indicated that the most common practice (50 per cent) is to hide 
sales revenues; 12 per cent reported wages paid to nonexistent employees; 
11 per cent padded expenses, and ten per cent padded purchases. There is 
a business of selling forged receipts to increase stated expenses (some 
are con games since the receipts are inadequate to pass even cursory 
inspection by tax auditors). 
This does not mean all SFEs are able to evade taxes. It is notewor-
thy that the tax evaders cited are mainly service establishments, where 
it is difficult to measure either output or material inputs, or their 
relationship is not close. Where material input-output relationships are 
relatively fixed—flour and sugar and bread and pastries for a baker, for 
example—auditing is easier and evasion is correspondingly more diffi-
cult. Some SFEs find themselves directly involved with local regulatory 
agencies. For example, all car sales are registered, and most repairs 
are done to meet annual inspection requirements and are so reported to 
the local authorities. 
To what extent does preferential or lenient tax treatment for SFEs 
confer such advantages that new SFEs are deliberately started, or delib-
erately remain small enough to avoid tax exposure? How important a 
reason is this, relative to the benefits of specialization and entrepre-
neurial independence, for the existence of clusters of the minuscule SFEs 
that subdivide the production of one product rather than integrating into 
one operation? How important is it in subcontracting arrangements? We 
do not know, and doubt that anyone does. Tax treatment probably is not a 
dominant reason for starting or maintaining an SFE, but it does make 
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their activities more profitable and hence enters into the cost/benefit 
calculus of any entrepreneur. 
The early 1970s witnessed a significant intensification of LDP 
interest in small business precipitated by the success of the Peoplefs 
Association of Commerce and Industry (Minshu Shokokai), an organization 
affiliated (informally) with the Japan Communist Party. Minsho was 
proving itself an effective force in recruiting small business people to 
the opposition cause in Japan1s larger cities, where in key instances 
mayoral and gubernatorial positions were being captured by alliances of 
opposition parties. The economic instability of the period added fuel to 
the discontent of urban small operators facing high inflation and then 
the recession induced by the oil-shock. Tanaka Kakuei, then prime 
minister, is credited with recognizing the need for a much stronger LDP 
approach to the small business sector as a whole in the face of Minsho 
activities. The relative decline of agriculture as the foundation of LDP 
electoral strength was certainly another consideration. 
MITIfs budget for loans to "very small enterprises" (five employees 
or fewer in manufacturing and two or fewer in retailing) was expanded 
dramatically from 30 billion to 240 billion yen, an eight-fold increase. 
The Bureau for Small and Medium Enterprises within MITI was elevated in 
status and its budget increased from ¥7.5 billion (1971) to ¥40 billion 
(1975), an increase in its share of the total MITI budget from 16 per 
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cent to 39 per cent. The tax laws were changed to allow wage 
deductions, as discussed above. 
MITI's role, however, has primarily been indirect. Government loans 
to very small businesses (funneled through private banks) are largely 
dependent on the guidance and tacit approval of "small business advisors" 
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operating as employees of local Chambers of Commerce (who screen and help 
SFEs prepare loan applications). There was a concomitant increase in the 
number of such advisors from nearly 16,000 in 1971 to 27,000 in 1975. 
Half their wages are paid by MITI, making them (at least partly) central 
government agents to the small business sector. The other half comes 
from the prefecture and the Chamber of Commerce. The result has been a 
blunting of the influence of Minsho and an increase in LDP visibility in 
the small business sector. This quasi-governmental loan/advisor system 
influences a sector of the voting public by channeling special funds to 
it. It also puts the Chamber of Commerce organization in close touch 
with small businesses across the nation and positions it to represent 
small business interests to the LDP. Chambers are typically led, howev-
er, by executives of larger local firms who focus on regional development 
issues, meaning that Chambers of Commerce are less representatives of the 
small business sector to the LDP and MITI than means of enrolling SFEs in 
local campaigns and controlling the small business sector to preclude the 
formation of opposition activities. 
By and large government economic policymakers apparently see small 
and medium sized enterprise more as a problem than as a source of econom-
ic growth and vitality. The lumping together of "Small and medium 
enterprise" into one category is a convenient misnomer; it combines 
several different realities, as our discussion of minuscule and small 
SFEs indicates. It enables the government to channel its resources to 
relatively larger firms which it considers of greater potential. There 
is considerable interest, at least at the rhetorical level, in positive 
programs to modernize and raise the technological level of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, particularly as reflected in publications of 
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MITI's Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. On the whole, nonetheless, 
MITI's policy approach is defensive. 
MITI apparently would prefer to engage in as little protection as 
possible short of serious economic and social disruption. Its tendency 
has been to approach problems in depressed industries as "special" and 
"temporary." With shingikai (advisory council) approval, it invokes 
numerous emergency powers aimed at preventing bankruptcies and encourag-
ing orderly adjustments within the specific industry. The effort is to 
contain problems without committing to long-term protection. The politi-
cal parties, on the other hand, must regularly appear responsive to small 
and medium business concerns, yet each party has constituencies opposed 
to protective policies. Politicians representing areas of depressed 
small manufacturing are the most susceptible to pressure, yet all politi-
cians seek the small business vote and must be particularly sensitive to 
complaints of such large groups as retailers or amalgams such as those 
comprised of various businesses concerned with health inspections. 
SFEs are but part of most complex policy issues. Consumer interests 
(even if politically less unorganized) are a significant factor, as are 
land use and urban planning, environmental issues, the welfare system and 
foreign policy. The large versus small dimension, in other words, is but 
the most visible conflict requiring a balancing of interests when such 
matters as the rate of expansion of even small supermarkets or large 
versus small food producers are the forefront issue. The LDP relies on 
too broad a spectrum of support to ignore other domestic concerns. MITI, 
furthermore, is the guardian of economic progress, and it resists protec-
tionist pressures from the standpoint of productivity gains or losses. 
Finally, Japan's place in the world gives the international dimension at 
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least a very strong potential influence, even though protection against 
import competition is politically the easiest resolution to small busi-
ness pressures. 
When momentum is great enough (i.e. political pressure is wide-
spread) the interplay of forces, however complex, appears to follow a 
rather simple pattern. Parties (LDP and opposition parties) position 
themselves as sympathetic to the problem, issuing general position 
statements calling for solutions without specifying a stand that would 
alienate their other key constituencies. MITI, while adopting a public 
posture of listening and concern, quietly attempts to delay the produc-
tion of actual protective legislation in hopes that the momentum will 
subside. If it does not, MITI authors a compromise bill (largely its own 
making) that satisfies the situation politically while preempting the 
generation of legislative bills by the parties and the Diet Legislative 
Bureau. MITI is thereby responsible. This benefits both the legislators 
who do not want to author what is certain to be controversial and (in 
some quarters) unpopular legislation, and those who want to take credit 
with their particular constituency. A MITI bill allows all parties to 
vote for the bill as a "government" resolution, one that has authority 
(statesmanship), but for which they need not be accountable. 
This is precisely the pattern followed in the recent large store 
legislation, the latest adjustment in a pattern of partial government 
protection for small retailers that began before WWII. MITI resisted 
political party pressure for about four years until it became clear that 
the Diet would introduce legislation on its own. It then prepared its 
own revised approach aimed at (1) blunting the suburban advance of small 
supermarkets and (2) shifting some decision making to local committees 
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made up of small retail and consumer representatives. As with previous 
laws, the basic effect of this new legislation is to slow but not end the 
growth of large scale retailing and to limit the impact of large new 
stores on a locality by reducing the proposed floor space and operating 
hours. 
MITI's latitude to respond administratively to circumstances in 
particular industries is great. Already on the books are a wide set of 
laws facilitating the provision of aid to medium and small firms SUffer-
ing serious difficulties. MITI's emergency powers are notably broad, 
flexible and free of legislative encumbrance. Loans, special tax mea-
sures, small business cartels in certain industries, insurance, retrain-
ing and reorganizational assistance can be activated at the Ministry's 
discretion (with shingikai approval). The total value of the aid avail-
able has never been calculated, it appears. The organizational channels 
for these measures are in place, since the laws designate industrial 
associations, Chambers of Commerce, public financial institutions, loan 
guarantee programs and the like as agents for the execution of special 
relief and restructuring efforts. The response time is thus quite rapid, 
as neither special legislation nor new organizations are required. The 
result is that precisely targeted, temporary measures based on a multi-
plicity of financial and other tools can be arranged without political 
debate. The limitations on this system are the ceilings on resources 
contained in MITI's budgetary allocations and in the various categories 
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of public loans available. The Ministry's continuing effectiveness, 
therefore, hinges on its conservation and astute allocation of these 
resources. 
63 
In sum, while a great deal of attention and financial support is 
regularly bestowed on the small business sector, few policies have been 
made to prevent small scale industries from declining. The family doctor 
makes many visits and prescribes various medicines, but is not inclined 
to put patients on life support systems. Rather policies have been 
formulated to ameliorate the pace and therefore the impact of decline 
with the intention of facilitating an orderly retreat or basic reorien-
tation. Loans, technical assistance, retraining grants, capacity scrap-
ping programs and the like are examples. MITI officials essentially seek 
to balance a strong commitment to encouraging change leading to greater 
overall economic efficiency with realities of a sociopolitical kind 
(unemployment costs, social dislocation and political pressures being 
very real considerations). They find themselves holding out (with 
considerable success so far) against outright protectionist policies, 
especially ones that will become chronic. In this the small business 
sector is fundamentally different from agriculture; the few exceptions, 
notably leather and leather goods, prove the rule as those products 
reflect the very special Burakumin political problem. 
It is also true, however, that the LDP and the government could be 
pushed in a more protectionist direction by the success of other parties 
in recruiting small business support. What would permit this to happen? 
In a major recession, for example, will the political clout of small 
business increase? They experience hardship early in the business cycle 
and this could translate into demands the government cannot effectively 
meet, causing a shift toward applying pressure through the opposition. 
Another scenario might begin with national tax reform proposals that 
unite small businesses against the government. Such a tax package might 
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emerge with the support of a constellation of three pressures: wage-
earner and consumer demands to correct the existing inequities in the tax 
system; Ministry of Finance bureaucrats and politicians anxious to raise 
taxes to reduce the huge budget deficit; and big business opposition to 
corporate tax increases. A value-added tax, much less the attempt to 
close existing loopholes, would meet much small business resistance. A 
third scenario would have progressives winning governorships on a 
pro-small business platform and then effecting much greater assistance to 
small businesses, including local forms of protectionist measures, 
thereby forcing the LDP to respond accordingly. The latter actually 
began to happen in the early 1970s. 
With the continuing combination of LDP strength and the present mix 
of government responses to small business issues there is more reason to 
work with rather than against the authorities; loans, temporary measures 
and partial help are better than rhetorical promises. Small business 
pragmatism, in other words, reinforces the LDP as long as it proves its 
electoral dominance and continues to factor in small business interests. 
It is well worth remembering that the small business sector is rarely 
presented with viable choice except in highly localized and industry 
specific matters, and in most of these instances, it is well within the 
LDP's capacity to co-opt the issue. 
Entrepreneurship. What does all this—factor markets, social networks, 
educational system, tax treatment, the economic, political, social, and 
cultural environment--add up to? A great deal of vitality in the small-
scale family enterprise sector, for one thing—large numbers of births, 
deaths, and resurrections. We pull our discussion together by examining 
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the whole set of issues involving entry, profitability, survival, and 
exit. 
In 1979 there were just over 16,000 bankruptcies in Japan. The 
number of bankruptcies has been steadily increasing over the last decade; 
almost all are small companies. Bankruptcies, however, account for only 
small part of the total number of enterprises that go out of business 
each year. From 1978 to 1981, for example, about 217,000 closed their 
doors, some 70,000 annually. More than 99 per cent of these were small 
and medium enterprises. The per cent of closings to the total number of 
establishments ranged between 3.2 to 4.2 per cent over the period from 
1966 to 1981. This represents a formidable failure rate, one at th,e 
heart of structural adjustment issues in Japan; yet the number of new 
small businesses forming each year has substantially surpassed the number 
of closings, resulting in a net increase in business establishments year 
after year. Again, virtually all of this activity is in the area of 
small and medium business. 
Nothing better illustrates the basic vitality of the small and 
medium business sector than the above portrait, one that balances the 
risks of small and medium business with the constant entrepreneurial 
activity at the lowest organizational levels of stable, growing, and 
emergent industries. That many new enterprises are formed each year 
attest to the ease of entry in the economy as a whole, though of course 
with immense sector-specific differences. Since many small firms rely 
extensively on trade credit, one default can cause a chain of bankrupt-
cies. Under Japanese law it is easy to go bankrupt or otherwise exit as 
an enterprise, reorganize, and be reborn. The net increase in enter-
prises signifies the basic strength and endurance of SFEs. 
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There are significant variations in the relationship of openings to 
closings. Small business adjustment must respond flexibly to annual as 
well as longer-term changing conditions. Each industry has its own 
distinct range of closing and start-up rates. Thus, throughout the 
1966-1981 period, the rate of openings in the service and wholesale-
retail sectors held steady at about six and seven per cent of total 
sector enterprises, while in manufacturing the rate plummeted from 6.5 to 
3.5 per cent beginning in the mid-1970s. The shift in the economic 
structure toward the service sector is clearly illustrated by this 
different response to the oil shock-induced recession and slower growth 
era, as well as to the evolution of aggregate demand. During that . 
recessionary period, small business opportunities in manufacturing 
declined sharply, whereas both the retail and service sectors continued 
to expand. Yet even in manufacturing the ratio of openings to closings 
remained narrowly positive, a result probably of a shift toward more, not 
less, reliance on subcontracting in major manufacturing industries such 
as machinery and electronics induced by efforts to control overall labor 
costs and retain productive flexibility on the part of large firms. 
This degree of entrepreneurial vitality comes as a surprise given 
the stereotypic portrait of the Japanese as a cautious, risk averse 
people who prefer the security of stable, well-defined relationships. 
Moreover, the best educated (and presumably most talented) Japanese are 
attracted to large firms (and elite government jobs) and rarely leave for 
any reason. Neither the modern education nor the employment system 
encourages development of an entrepreneurial spirit or a class of talent-
ed people who are recognized and rewarded for their*entrepreneurial 
inclinations. The dominant cultural and social descriptions of postwar 
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Japan do not lead one to expect much in the way of entrepreneurial 
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vitality. 
Survey data help us better understand the conditions of entrepre-
neurship, and provide specific evidence bearing on many of the issues 
raised earlier. The most extensive, regular survey is undertaken by the 
People's Finance Corporation. In 1981, of a sample of 1,400 start-up 
businesses in all sectors, over half were formed by relatively young 
individuals, people in their thirties. Only about ten per cent of all 
new businesses were begun by people 45 years old and above. Many older 
people do find work in small and medium businesses, but they are not 
founding many of them. 
What about the educational background of these entrepreneurs? In 
1966, only 13 per cent of the sample had university educations, whereas 
by 1981 35 per cent had four years of post secondary schooling (higher in 
urban areas) and another eight per cent graduated from junior college or 
its technical equivalent. Unfortunately, we do not know very much about 
the status ranking of the universities involved, but nevertheless, the 
general impression is that Japan1s new entrepreneurs represent nearly all 
segments of the population as measured by educational background. 
In the same survey the largest group of entrepreneurs (70 per cent) 
come from the middle levels of small and medium businesses. Even so, 
entrepreneurs come from a relatively wide range of firms and levels. 
Koike found that nearly half of the workers in very small firms of ten or 
fewer employees eventually set up their own businesses. In 1982, for 
example, some 65,000 men established their own (unincorporated) individu-
al proprietorships. Of these, 48 per cent had been employees in FSEs; 
another 20 per cent had worked in enterprises of 30-299 employees; and 14 
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per cent had changed the form of their self-employment. This suggests 
extraordinary mobility and entrepreneurship in the smallest enterprises. 
The highly aggregated nature of statistics on small and medium 
business is vexing because common sense leads one to think there are 
discrete patterns of entrepreneurship among different types of business-
es; for example, between those in which specialized skills and education 
play a large role (such as business services, high tech, information 
management and advertising) and those based primarily on location (such 
as retailing and restaurants). We can only speculate that younger, 
educated people leaving larger firms are entering different kinds of 
business than their less educated peers leaving smaller firms. 
In the People's Finance Corporation survey many reasons were given 
for starting onefs own company; the most popular being: "to realize 
technical skills and general ability" (70 per cent), "to be able to work 
in a manner consistent with my nature" (55 per cent), "an attraction to 
managing one's own business" (39 per cent). Improved income was selected 
by less than one third and "dislike of being in another*s employ" was 
chosen by an impressive 30 per cent. An equal proportion complained of 
being blocked in advancement. The overall impression is one of ambi-
tious, independent people stepping out of employment situations in which 
they felt limited. Case studies of new small businesses reveal that many 
start-ups have been planned well in advance with previous employment 
being treated as preparatory training. The people involved are not elite 
managers nor are they big risk takers seeking high returns, but neither 
are they incompetents forced into small scale entrepreneurship. 
The survey also reveals that various people play a part in encourag-
ing entrepreneurs to start their own businesses. As already noted, new 
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businesses generally begin with a modest plan that relies heavily on 
existing relationships to reduce risk. In this survey, 45 per cent 
mentioned a friend, relative or business client as urging them to set out 
on their own. The practice of noren wake (an employer-guided new busi-
ness creation) characterized another nine per cent. In about one-third 
of the cases (overlapping) customers and/or former employers played a 
role. 
The same survey offers a rather detailed portrait of start-up 
conditions in terms of capital investment, employees and so forth. The 
very low level of initial investment is striking—some ¥9.2 million 
($36,800) on average, with slightly more for equipment than for working 
capital. Surprisingly, restaurants were the most capital intensive, both 
in amount (¥16.4 million, $65,600) and in the share for equipment (80 per 
cent). The least capital was required in manufacturing and construction. 
An average start-up investment of ¥5 million ($20,000) for manufac-
turers, for example, is so small that it is difficult to grasp the actual 
cost structure involved. The purchase of used machinery and payment of 
"key money" on rental space are the two largest items in many cases. The 
majority of new enterprises establishing production do one or more of the 
following: locate in their own homes or in borrowed space; primarily use 
family labor; acquire leased or used machinery; maintain very small 
inventories; utilize materials supplied by customers; and have very low 
administrative and sales costs. These conditions are best met in subcon-
tracting arrangements, where the new company begins producing for a 
larger contractor, assembly firm, or trading company. Initial production 
of one or a few items requiring limited equipment and space is the 
pattern. If the patron*s demand is steady, the new business begins with 
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a level of business that is secure and predictable. In such circumstanc-
es, one would expect profits to be squeezed by the knowledge and power of 
the patron, and this corresponds to the fact that risks and the cost of 
entry are also low. Unfortunately, the survey does not separate manufac-
turing start-ups into categories that would further clarify these issues. 
According to the People's Finance Corporation the funds for start-
ups come essentially from three sources: owner-operator investment 
(46 per cent), loans from financial institutions (39 per cent), and 
personal loans from friends, relatives and the like (12 per cent). In a 
separate study of almost 200 incorporated companies in their second year 
of business, it was found that 38 per cent of assets and working funds 
originated from business relationships in the form of credits. Owner-
operated investment and institutional loans dropped to 30 and 17 per cent 
respectively. The one exception to this pattern is restaurants, where 
business credits accounted for only five per cent of total second year 
funding. The central role of larger, more established firms in setting 
small businesses in motion by supplying credit is notable as it also 
illustrates the interrelational framework within which small businesses 
exist. The national pattern is for about six in ten new businesses to be 
based entirely or primarily in the family, but regional variations are 
large. More than half of the big city based businesses begin with 
employees being more important than family workers, whereas in rural 
areas the family is central in 80 per cent of the cases. 
The small scale of most start-ups is further shown in anticipated 
first year sales. Fewer than ten per cent of new companies expected 
monthly sales in their first year to be above ¥10 million ($40,000), and 
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the average was about ¥2 million ($8,000). Ten per cent expect monthly 
sales of less than ¥500,000 ($2,000). 
Since almost all new businesses begin very small and rely substan-
tially on the unaccounted assets of land, personal networks and family 
labor, barriers to entry are low and center on lack of connection, 
skills, and family labor. These are not purchased on open markets, but 
are acquired as social/experience assets. Land is often an asset pos-
sessed by a household in older industries and neighborhoods. The rental 
of small spaces is relatively easy in Japan compared to the acquisition 
of large spaces. This too may favor small scale activity. 
We do not have data, however, on other important issues. To what 
extent, for example, are start-ups of larger firms (with 30 to 100 or 
more employees) occuring? We know these occur regularly as joint ven-
tures or as spin-offs from larger companies. (See the chapters by Aoki, 
and Saxonhouse and Okimoto.) Our hypothesis is that except for spin-offs 
almost all Japanese new enterprises begin very small, and that the 
current distribution of small and medium enterprises by size is predomi-
nantly a consequence of growth. Is this pattern specific to Japan, or is 
there a similar pattern in Western Europe and the United States? 
We also know little about the internal life-cycle of small Japanese 
businesses. If they survive, which kinds continue to grow? We know that 
most reach a plateau while still small. We also note the capacity of 
owner-operated, family businesses to endure setbacks and cyclical down-
turns. Labor input and cost elasticities are great as longer hours or 
less income are tolerated consequences of owning one's own business. In 
adversity, one or more members of the family can work outside to supple-
ment household income. This flexibility of response to hard times stems 
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from the fact it is total household income/expense balancing, not just 
business income or profitability, that determines the persistence of many 
marginal enterprises. This capacity for survival helps underwrite the 
persistence and adaptability of many industries based on small scale 
producers. It enhances the industry*s tolerance of cycles and buys time 
to adapt and change when an industry is permanently on a downward trend, 
since neither skills nor connections nor location are lost. 
Low costs of entry and risk sharing are thus associated with low 
expectations about margins and a flexibility in adversity that distin-
guishes small business in Japan from both larger businesses and small 
business in countries in which start-up costs are higher, risks are not 
spread as widely and/or family labor and other assets are not pivotal. 
Any calculation of return on investment and profitability hinge on the 
value given to family labor, of course, and this is a highly subjective 
matter from the owner-operator1s point of view. Life-style and personal 
satisfactions, other work options for family members and long-term 
prospects for success are considerations. So too is the fact that 
success will not be taxed at the same rates as salaried work. 
The great number of small businesses is not, however, a testimony to 
their being an easy or even preferred means of making a living. Working 
conditions in small factories and other establishments are often among 
the worst in Japan. Long hours, cramped spaces, lack of safety equip-
ment, poor lighting, noise, and so forth are common; and much of the 
labor is physical. While owner-operators have hopes for success, some 
independence, variety of work and other modest benefits, their employees 
experience only the difficulties. They do this due to the absence of 
other options or because they hope to learn skills and make connections 
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that someday will give them the chance to be independent. Such assets 
are not cheap viewed in the light of such an apprenticeship. 
Ill. The Future of Small Business 
The many reasons for the continuing existence, expansion or decline 
of small family-owned enterprises that we have traced provide insights 
into their future prospects. Our overall "best guess" is that small-
scale enterprise will continue to be a large, important, and on the whole 
positive component of the Japanese economy, and that any substantial 
changes in its overall role will come about as a process of gradual 
evolution rather than discontinuously. The essential core of the SFE as 
an institution—entrepreneurship, family ownership and work effort, 
special skills, effective social networks, specialized production of 
goods or services for particular market niches, and above all flexibility 
and adaptability-provide a strong basis for ongoing economic success. 
Of course the story will differ sector by sector and family by 
family. There are major unknowns. In general, how rapidly will the 
political economy and SFEs within it adjust to existing and future 
inefficiencies in resource allocation as relative prices continue to 
change? More specifically, what will happen to land prices, and how will 
land markets change? Will new technologies decrease, or enhance, the 
competitiveness of SFEs, and in which sectors? What will be the future 
political role of SFEs? And how will the aging of the population, namely 
the projected great increase in numbers of old workers, effect the SFE 
system? We can only speculate briefly on these questions. Before that, 
however, we provide our general evaluation of small family enterprises in 
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the Japanese economy in terms of allocative efficiency, contracyclical 
macroeconomic efficiency and flexibility. 
Changes in the absolute and relative role of small enterprises over 
the long run will be driven predominantly by economic forces: changes in 
demand, market competition, market pressures toward efficient allocation 
of resources, especially the heterogeneous resources of labor and land. 
New enterprises will seek out new opportunities. On the other hand, the 
decline of enterprises in increasingly uncompetitive sectors will be 
mediated and slowed by the time the intergenerational process of change 
takes. While their value may be declining, enterprises operated by older 
persons will persist by living off their specific human capital and the 
implicit rents of other assets, especially land. Moreover, where small 
enterprises can maintain or form effective interest groups they will 
continue to use the political process to insulate themselves as much and 
as long as possible against the inevitable cold winds of market forces. 
Certainly some SFEs in some sectors represent a socially inefficient 
packaging of resources. Capital is overabundant in agriculture, but 
perhaps still inadequately supplied to some (especially minuscule) SFEs 
in secondary and tertiary sectors. Excessive land fragmentation in 
agriculture and probably in most urban areas results in less than optimal 
land use. The great heterogeneity of labor accounts for much of the 
existing wage differentials, but nonetheless substantial allocative 
inefficiencies remain, especially in the discriminatory treatment of 
women, older persons, part-time workers, and minorities. The issue of 
discrimination against females is more subtle than it appears, since it 
is founded substantially on traditional Japanese conception of the 
"proper role of women" in society. Some may object to our use of the 
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term "discrimination," but the phenomenon is real, whatever the labelling 
or semantics. At any rate, taking these labor market imperfections as 
givens, SFEs can generally be regarded as effective instruments for 
reducing such imperfections by taking advantage of them; certainly they 
do not create them. However, in sectors in which SFEs are on the defen-
sive, notably agriculture and some very small retail establishments, they 
perpetuate and enhance economic inefficiency. Thus our overall evalua-
tion of the role of the small enterprise sector in terms of allocative 
efficiency is mixed; SFEs warrant only moderately good marks. 
One of the great costs in macroefficiency of advanced industrial 
market economies derives from the downswings of the business cycle. The 
output periodically foregone because of underutilized labor and capital 
during recessions is huge, far greater than that foregone because of 
static inefficiencies of resource allocation. Small family enterprise in 
Japan has been a very effective contracyclical as well as secular absorb-
er of labor through a variety of highly flexible mechanisms—from start-
ing one's own business to family labor to newly-hired employees. We 
believe a careful analysis would show that small business plays an 
important stabilizing role, serving to reduce the overt unemployment that 
would otherwise occur; this role is subsidized to some extent by the 
tax-paying employees of larger firms and consumers of protected products. 
SFEs still earn excellent marks by this criterion. 
The small business sector generally provides great flexibility for 
the Japanese economy, accelerating the process of structural adjustment. 
Entry is easy. Many enterprises die, due either to their own incompe-
tence (the inevitable price of an active, ambitious, entrepreneurially-
oriented population) or to changing market conditions, or to the lack of 
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a successor. Many more are started. Many rapidly transform their 
product mix and their activities, responding to the pulls and pushes of 
the marketplace. Offsetting this, however, are the inefficient SFEs able 
to mobilize political power to retard their own decline; they reduce the 
overall flexibility. The grade on flexibility is nonetheless very good. 
The social value placed on small, family-owned and operated 
enterprises—in all sectors--seems quite high. They are regarded not 
only as natural and inevitable, but desirable. Japanese consumers and 
taxpayers have long tolerated high agricultural prices based on economi-
cally inefficient production, and seem to be willing to tolerate the 
efforts of small shopkeepers to slow down the entrance of even small 
supermarkets into their neighborhoods. On the other hand, there does not 
seem to be any great idealization of family farms or small shopkeepers as 
an essential feature of the Japanese way of life that must be maintained 
and protected at all cost, or indeed much more cost than at present. We 
believe Japan's new middle mass, or even a healthy new nationalism, are 
too efficiency-oriented, too pragmatic, to suffer permanent or increasing 
subsidization of notably inefficient SFEs. 
The fate of the small enterprise sector is inexorably caught up in 
the future prospects for the Japanese economy and society as a whole. 
Growing GNP per capita will continue the trend in the composition of 
demand toward services, many of which are income-elastic and are effi-
ciently provided by small scale enterprises. Within distribution, 
there will be considerable fighting and jockeying for position among 
different levels of small enterprises; the smallest (the least efficient 
as measured by sales per worker) will continue to resist market intrusion 
by larger, more modern firms. There will be considerable transformation, 
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exemplified by the way in which Ito-Yokado Company has turned traditional 
mom and pop establishments into 7-Eleven store franchises. As well as 
their serving as barriers to new (including imported) products, the 
inefficiency of retail services and of distribution in general are likely 
to be a source of increasing political tension. 
As Japan progresses toward its current vision of the future as an 
information society, small high tech firms are likely to proliferate—in 
computer software, specific products or components, or related services--
since there are few economies of scale and simple organizational struc-
tures encourage creativity, innovation, and quick responsiveness. Many 
will be in the developing venture capital market. While efficient> 
productive, glamorous growth nodes of the future, such high tech firms 
nonetheless will comprise only a tiny share of the SFE sector in numbers, 
employment, or even direct output. 
Real wages will continue to rise and the relative cost of capital to 
decline. So long as the liberal international economic system remains in 
order (i.e., Japan remains committed to free trade), the trend will be to 
greater specialization within Japanfs manufacturing structure, and a 
substantially higher share of imports of standard labor-intensive manu-
factured goods. These trends will put increasing market pressure on SFEs 
in manufacturing, both for final markets and as subcontractors. Perhaps 
even more important will be the policies of medium and large firms. In a 
more slowly growing economy they may seek growth by expanding into 
domestic markets now dominated by small firms, by vertically integrating 
by reducing reliance on subcontractors, or by turning to the cheaper 
labor of offshore economies for simple components. 
78 
Many SFE manufacturers have created effective market niches by 
specializing in relatively small-lot production. Import competition is 
less a potential problem than the emergence of new, computer-based, 
flexible production systems which enable large firms to produce small 
lots competitively would be. Moreover, a few larger firms have recently 
begun substituting part-time female production workers for for full-time 
(male) workers. If this becomes widespread (not likely in our judgment 
since large firms prefer a homogeneous, stable labor force), then large 
firms will bid away one of the advantages of SFEs in existing labor 
market imperfections. 
We have argued that many of the benefits for SFEs derive from .labor 
and land market imperfections of one kind or another, as well as from the 
institutional or bureaucratic rigidities of large firms and favorable tax 
treatment. More perfect financial and capital markets will help SFEs 
where they have previously been at a disadvantage. On the other hand, 
more perfect labor and land markets will reduce the opportunities for 
SFEs to find and take advantage of existing imperfections. Existing 
disparities between relative wages and productivities may decrease over 
time, though we suspect they will always persist to some degree since 
equilibrium is never achieved in practice in a growing economy. 
We anticipate that the many barriers to more perfect land markets-
institutional, legal, tax, generational preferences—will remain strong. 
Even so, underlying conditions affecting land markets are likely to 
change substantially. In our judgment, the trend of huge increases in 
the relative price of land between the early 1950s and mid-1970s will not 
persist in the future. There will not be increases in (relative) prices 
of agricultural output to be capitalized in higher rural land prices. 
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With some lags, urban land use is becoming more efficient, as witnessed 
by the increasing average height of buildings. With financial liberal-
ization, financial assets will become more attractive. High inheritance 
taxes and the inevitability of land transfer through death will force 
land revaluations, sales, and more efficient use of land. Over time the 
lengthy one-shot effect of huge capital gains in land will be adjusted 
and high implicit rents will be reduced. However, it is unlikely that 
the primacy of tenant rights will be seriously eroded: too many vested 
interests are at stake. 
The most problematic area is agriculture, which combines great 
economic inefficiency and high prices visible at home and abroad, immense 
political power enhanced beyond mere numbers by gerrymandering and 
multiple-member voting districts, and a profound incipient generational 
change. More than a quarter (27.5 per cent) of Japanese farmers are age 
60 or older, and almost another third (32.1 per cent) are between 50 and 
59. What will happen when they die? There will be two trends at work. 
Economic efficiency dictates that land should be consolidated into much 
larger, contiguous production units. But that requires effective rental 
and purchase markets for farm land, and reasonable prices; there are 
legal and other barriers to both. Land consolidation will proceed at too 
slow a pace and effect too little land to enable an efficient scale of 
farm family enterprise to emerge. The second trend will be for (perhaps 
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early) retirees from nonfarm jobs to take over land from their parents, 
or more likely, to farm as a side occupation. If Japanese-style "gentle-
men farmers" contributing little labor producing simple crops such as 
rice exercise strong political clout to maintain the present system of 
subsidized farming, a generational transformation may not occur, or may 
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be far different from the efficient solution economists hope will come 
about. 
All the evidence indicates that workers in small-scale family 
enterprises outside agriculture work longer hours, under worse condi-
tions, and for lower pay and fewer fringe benefits than those in larger 
enterprises or the civil service. Yet there does not seem to be a strong 
sense of discontent or unfairness or alienation pervading Japanese 
society. True, opposition parties obtain a majority of the popular vote, 
but the SFE's vote is little understood. 
We can only speculate about sources of the high degree of social and 
political stability and the role of SFEs in it. Certainly the very high 
rate of employment is important; given wage flexibility, the nonexistence 
of effective minimum wage legislation, family connections and the preva-
lence of family businesses, almost everyone can find some sort of job. 
Despite ongoing wage differentials, Japanese income distribution is 
comparatively equal, as the Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba chapter documents. 
Small enterprises offer Japan*s minorities economic independence and some 
opportunity; for Burakumin it is a protected opportunity (beef, leather 
goods). Most of all, Japanese culture appears to have socialized most 
Japanese to accept their lot in life, not to rebel against it. Women, 
both in and outside the labor force, provide the most clear-cut example. 
For males, a system of economic and social mobility based largely on 
merit (ability and effort) as screened through the educational system 
apparently has broad acceptance. For most, the hurdles to get into the 
elite are accepted as too high. So one plays within the system, taking 
advantage of it wherever possible—using personal connections, evading 
taxes, forming narrow-interest pressure groups to influence politicians. 
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Small business is the outlet and opportunity for those who are hopeful 
and ambitious, and either not hired by large employers or not wanting to 
be. 
All this may change—not so much because of worsened circumstances 
as because of heightened consciousness among the groups comprising the 
SFE sector (analogous to the increase in agrarian landlord-tenant dis-
putes in the 1920s). Certainly the consciousness of farmers and their 
capacity to organize effective political pressure is already high and 
will persist. We think there is a good chance that small business 
interests, especially in services, will become an even more visible and 
powerful political force in the coming decade—and we perhaps have not 
adequately stressed their present effectiveness in protecting their own 
interests. The postwar eras, first of reconstruction then rapid growth, 
submerged the conflicts of interest between efficiency and income distri-
bution, particularly the protection of income (and wealth) of vested 
interest groups. It is quite possible that these issues will become more 
and more pronounced, as other SFEs join with agriculture in pushing their 
interests, and with increasing effectiveness. 
Changes in perceptions and values ("raising of consciousness") will 
affect the behavior and demands of the two main pools of underutilized 
labor—women and older workers. Our guess is that women will change only 
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very slowly and gradually in terms of Western criteria. A more likely 
source of social discontent lies in the increasing numbers of older male 
workers retiring from large institutions not into cushy, minor league 
amakudari positions but into a highly competitive SFE labor market. The 
question is the degree to which they will have the capacity to organize 
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as an effective interest group on their own, or to influence others 
(their children) on their behalf. 
The sharp increase in the number and proportion of older persons-
over 60, over 65, over 70--in the next two decades and thereafter is 
likely to have a momentous, wide-ranging impact on the Japanese economy 
and society (see the chapter by Noguchi). One-third (3.1 million) of 
those over 65 are currently working; another 640,000 would like jobs, 
mainly part-time or at home, and half say their main reason for working 
is to increase their income. We anticipate that many in the future aging 
population will have the desire or need to work. Moreover, this labor 
market pressure is exacerbated by the relatively early retirement age 
(not expected to rise above age 60) of large firm and government 
employees. Retirees and older persons generally will have to seek jobs 
in SFEs, as owner-operators, family labor, or wage-earning employees. 
Some will participate in the U-turn phenomenon, returning home or nearby 
where land ownership will make it possible to have work. The evidence 
does not indicate that many older people are starting new enterprises. 
That could change, and more will inherit existing family enterprises—in 
agriculture, retail or elsewhere where land ownership can be combined 
with even low productivity labor input to generate some level of income. 
Others will be the low-paid, part-time, low-productivity labor force of 
the future. Some basic questions arise. Which is better for the well-
being of old people: being involved in some work or retiring fully? Do 
they contribute much to value-added and GNP? Or do they require, or 
perpetuate, the inefficient allocation of land and perhaps capital, so 
that the packaged contribution is negative? Is it efficient or desirable 
to have a welfare system that encourages, or even virtually requires, old 
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